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INTRODUCTION 
The path walked by a well-meaning fiduciary is fraught with peril.  
Trustees, lawyers, company directors, and other fiduciaries are 
bedeviled by conflicts owed to multiple principals.  Should an 
attorney, for example, violate one client’s trust by disclosing 
information that could result in the acquittal of another client 
wrongly accused of a crime?  Should a trustee continue to loan trust 
assets to a company on which he serves as a director after learning 
privately that the company is doomed?  In these situations, the 
fiduciary is faced with a challenging dilemma.  He can respect the 
wishes of one principal, but in doing so, he may fail to perform his 
duty to another.  How should a fiduciary resolve such a conflict? 
The principal debate attending fiduciary duties over the past 
twenty-five years has sidestepped this question and focused on others 
instead.  A large body of literature contends that fiduciary duties are 
barnacles on the ship of contract, default contractual terms to which 
the parties would agree if they had the benefit of unlimited 
resources.1  While this debate helps place fiduciary duties under the 
                                                          
 1. See generally ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, PARTNERSHIP § 6.07(a), at 
6.110-111 (Aspen Publishers Supp. 2003-2) (1988) (explaining that “[f]iduciary 
duties are essentially part of the standard form contract that governs partnership in 
the absence of contrary agreement”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, 
Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993) (describing the fiduciary 
relation as contractual and subject to high costs of specification and monitoring); 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 
698, 702 (1982) (theorizing that investors and agents would bargain for fiduciary 
rules if an agreement on such rules could be made at no cost); John H. Langbein, 
The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 629 (1995) (purporting 
that fiduciary duties in trust law are “unambiguously contractarian” despite the desire 
to hold fiduciary obligations sacred); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the 
Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary 
Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 28 (1991) (claiming that fiduciary duties are a legal 
construct which fill in the unspecified terms of shareholders’ contingent contracts); 
Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims:  Obligations to Nonshareholder 
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rubric of contract law, it does not address conflicts between and 
among principals faced by fiduciaries.  A related body of literature 
has evolved surrounding the source of the fiduciary relationship.  
Many commentators have argued that fiduciary relationships arise 
from a grant of power or authority from the principal to the fiduciary 
to act on the principal’s behalf.2  While this discussion helps to 
account for when fiduciary duties arise, it does not address how to 
resolve conflicts of duties owed to multiple principals. 
This Article attempts to fill the gap and presents an account for 
how courts decide such cases.  It demonstrates that one can best 
understand the way courts resolve these conflicts by analyzing the 
nature or character of the particular duties imposed.  This Article will 
                                                          
Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 1273 (1999) 
(concluding that fiduciary duties are essentially contractual in nature).  Other 
commentators are critical of the contract model.  See, e.g., Robert C. Clark, Agency 
Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS:  THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 
55, 63 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1991) (noting that courts have 
failed to delineate how fiduciary duties fill in contractual gaps and ambiguities); 
Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 
767, 768 (2000) (noting that cognitive factors lead courts to analyze property-based 
fiduciary relationships differently than contractual relationships); Victor Brudney, 
Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595, 627 (1997) 
(contrasting the neutral character of restrictions on opportunistic behavior imposed 
by background contractual terms with fiduciary rules that are comprehensive and 
one-sided); Deborah H. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor:  An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 
1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 889-90 (1988) (contending that “the ‘hypothetical bargain’ view 
of fiduciary obligation does not help to explain the law”); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary 
Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1266 (1995) (highlighting the 
insufficiency of the contract model for fiduciary relationships because it relies on 
trust); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425, 478 
(1993) (challenging those who predicate the notion of fiduciary loyalty on efficiency 
because such an explanation misses both the nature and importance of trust). 
 2. Fiduciary duties are said to arise as a constraint on opportunism presented to 
the fiduciary by virtue of the power or authority he receives from the principal.  See, 
e.g., Alexander, supra note 1, at 774-75 (comparing the horizontal and the vertical 
nature of non-fiduciary and fiduciary relationships); Victor Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology 
in Transactions Affecting Corporate Control, 65 MICH. L. REV. 259, 275 (1966) (proposing 
that the fiduciary ideology is a “prophylactic prohibition” where the opportunity to 
benefit the trustee is large and unclear whether the beneficiary is deprived of 
anything); Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship:  Its 
Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1991) 
(charging that the separation of ownership from control or management creates 
opportunities for the agent to skim assets); Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligation, 
9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 285, 295 n.46 (1989) (stating that the access to assets can 
create fiduciary status because it provides the opportunity for abuse); Frankel, supra 
note 1, at 1224 n.37 (explaining that fiduciary law is founded on the need to prevent 
one person from misappropriating another person’s valuables); Tamar Frankel, 
Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 825 (1983) (determining that the fiduciary duty 
fluctuates according to the degree of potential abuse of power stemming from the 
relation); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. 
REV. 1399, 1444 (2002) (justifying the decision to impose fiduciary duties on the 
ability of the fiduciary to act opportunistically); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary 
Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 4 (1975) (characterizing the fiduciary obligation as 
a “blunt tool” for the control of fiduciary discretion). 
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show that the two main branches of fiduciary duty—the duty of 
loyalty and the duty of care—differ in character.  The duty of loyalty 
is primarily a negative duty not to harm the principal, and it is 
unambiguous in what it requires.  The duty of care is positive—a duty 
to promote the ends of the principal—and it is open-ended and variable in 
nature.  When duties of loyalty and care collide, courts generally 
resolve the conflict in favor of the duty of loyalty representing 
minimum conduct to which the fiduciary must adhere. 
The central thrust of the Article is explanatory.  Courts deciding 
conflicts of duty cases in many areas of fiduciary law base their 
decisions on theories or doctrines applied on an ad hoc basis.  
Underlying the cases is a tension between promoting the duty of 
loyalty or the duty of care, but not both.  In each case, courts resolve 
the tension by enforcing the duty of loyalty to one principal even if it 
results in a diminution in the duty of care to another.  Once this 
principle is uncovered, the cohesiveness of the cases becomes clear.  
They are decided on a rational basis consistently applied.  This 
Article’s objective is to explain that conflict of duty cases—regardless 
of the type of fiduciary involved—are coherent at their core. 
To assist in this explanation, I trace the differences between the 
duty of loyalty and the duty of care to Immanuel Kant’s discussion of 
perfect and imperfect duties.  Kant divided all duties into these two 
categories, and the difference between them illuminates the 
difference between the duty of loyalty and the duty of care.  An 
examination of fiduciary duties in light of Kant’s perfect and 
imperfect duties is absent from both the legal and philosophical 
literature.  I explore this analogy and conclude that comparing 
Kant’s perfect and imperfect duties with the fiduciary’s duties of 
loyalty and care helps explain and justify why courts treat breaches of 
the duty of care more leniently than breaches of the duty of loyalty.  
And it provides the key to resolving conflicts of duty in favor of the 
duty of loyalty, not the duty of care. 
Understanding the nature of loyalty and care in fiduciary 
relationships, and how it bears on resolving conflicts of duty, is 
important and timely.  Many of our affairs are entrusted to fiduciaries 
such as attorneys, investment professionals, company directors, and 
others.  The decisions they make on our behalf can govern our 
health, affect our property, determine our retirement savings, and 
influence our well-being in numerous other ways.  In some areas, 
such as corporate governance, the fiduciary’s role is undergoing 
scrutiny and reevaluation.  The numerous corporate failures and 
mutual fund scandals in the United States have directed attention to 
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the role of company boards and whether directors are performing 
their duties adequately.  Thus, while fiduciary duties historically have 
evolved through the common law, in recent years, Congress,3 the 
Securities and Exchange Commission,4 the American Bar 
Association,5 and others6 are grappling with ways to minimize 
breaches of fiduciary duty. 
                                                          
 3. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 301, 402, 307, 116 
Stat. 745 (2002) (regulating accounting, auditing, and corporate governance 
extensively, including setting forth the requirements governing the responsibilities of 
audit committees (§ 301), prohibiting loans to officers and directors of public 
companies (§ 402), and requiring the reporting by lawyers of certain violations of law 
(§ 307)). 
 4. See, e.g., Investment Adviser Code of Ethics, Investment Advisers Act Release 
No. 2209, 69 Fed. Reg. 4040-01 (Jan. 27, 2004) (expressing concern that the 
obligations of the duty of loyalty are lost on the growing number of advisers in the 
enforcement calendar), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ia-
2209.htm; Compliance Programs for Investment Companies and Investment 
Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2204, 68 Fed. Reg. 74714-01 (Dec. 24, 
2003) (noting that the rule requires advisers to consider their fiduciary duties under 
the Advisers Act and to shape procedures to address them), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2204.htm; Management’s Report on Internal 
Controls Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act 
Periodic Reports, Securities Act Release No. 8238, 68 Fed. Reg. 36636-01 (June 18, 
2003) (stating that the rule amendments are meant to improve disclosure about the 
extent of management’s responsibility for financial statements, internal controls, and 
means by which management discharges responsibilities), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8238.htm; Standards Relating to Listed Company 
Audits, Securities Act Release No. 8220, 68 Fed. Reg. 18788-01 (Apr. 16, 2003) 
(increasing the competence of audit committees to improve accountability and the 
quality of financial disclosure and oversight), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8220.htm; Implementation of Standards of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 8185, 68 Fed. Reg. 
6296-01 (Feb. 6, 2003) (observing that these requirements will make it more likely 
that companies will address misconduct internally and remedy violations at earlier 
stages), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm. 
 5. See American Bar Association, Report of the American Bar Association Task Force 
on Corporate Responsibility, 59 BUS. LAW. 145, 147 (2003) (providing analysis and 
recommendations to govern behavior “that conforms to law and results from the 
proper exercise of fiduciary duties of care and loyalty”). 
 6. See, e.g., GEORGE BENSTON ET AL., FOLLOWING THE MONEY:  THE ENRON FAILURE 
AND THE STATE OF CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 49-80 (2003) (proposing ways to fix 
corporate disclosure, such as incremental reforms, the formulation of a global 
standard, innovative monitoring, and improved incentives); IRA M. MILLSTEIN & PAUL 
W. MACAVOY, THE RECURRENT CRISIS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 114 (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2004) (charging that board members recognize their duty to those who 
count on their honesty, loyalty, and good faith for protection); Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, Crisis in Confidence:  Corporate Governance and Professional Ethics Post 
Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 919-20 (2003) (endorsing Sarbanes-Oxley’s expanded 
penal net, but criticizing Congress’s failure to take responsibility for its own 
contribution to corporate mis-governance); Lyman Johnson, After Enron:  Remembering 
Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 29 (2003) (reinforcing the 
notion that loyalty should be central to corporate well-being, especially after Enron); 
David Millon, Who “Caused” the Enron Debacle, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 309, 312 (2003) 
(exploring the gatekeeper’s function and the relevance of causing liability to 
minimizing breaches of fiduciary duties); Joseph T. Walsh, The Fiduciary Foundation of 
Corporate Law, 27 J. CORP. L. 333, 339 (2002) (suggesting that Enron’s collapse may 
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The Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I begins with an overview 
of the problem.  It describes circumstances in which a fiduciary faces 
a conflict and is left with no choice but to breach one duty in order to 
perform another.  Part I also discusses approaches to address such 
conflicts and why the approaches do not explain consistently how 
such cases have been resolved.  Part II discusses how the twin duties 
imposed in a fiduciary relationship—the duty of loyalty and the duty 
of care—differ in character.  The duty of loyalty is a duty of omission, 
requiring the fiduciary to refrain from conduct harmful to the 
principal.  The duty of loyalty is an example of Kant’s perfect duties.  
The duty of care is a duty of commission, requiring the fiduciary to 
engage in conduct for the benefit of the principal.  Yet no rule or set 
of rules can fully describe the duty of care.  Rather, the fiduciary must 
make the well-being of the principal his goal and act accordingly.  
The duty of care is an example of Kant’s imperfect duties.  Part III 
applies these principles to several cases and posits that such 
principles, whether articulated or not, account for how the cases are 
decided.  Part III explains that when courts must determine whether 
to enforce the duty of loyalty or the duty of care, they opt to enforce 
the duty of loyalty.  Negative duties triumph over positive ones; duties 
of omission triumph over duties of commission. 
I. CONFLICTS OF DUTY 
A fiduciary relationship is a relationship of trust and confidence 
where one party (the principal) places control over her property or 
affairs with another (the fiduciary), and the fiduciary agrees to act in 
the principal’s benefit with respect to her property or affairs.7  Some 
                                                          
cause us to reexamine the public responsibility of private corporations and the 
fiduciary duty of disclosure of corporate directors); Symposium, Van Gorkom and the 
Corporate Board:  Problem, Solution, or Placebo, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 447 (2002) (discussing 
the Van Gorkom duty of care standard); Kurt Eichenwald, In String of Corporate 
Troubles, Critics Focus on Boards’ Failings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2003, at A1 (questioning 
whether members of corporate boards always work on their investors’ behalf); David 
Gische & Jo Ann Abramson, Corporate Fiduciary Liability Claims in the Post-Enron Era, at 
http://articles.corporate.findlaw.com/articles/file/00295/008474 (last visited Jan. 
31, 2005) (stating that ERISA class action lawsuits against corporate directors for 
breach of fiduciary duty are troubling because they (i) expand the definition of 
fiduciary to include officers not directly responsible for plan assets, and (ii) impinge 
on otherwise regulated fields, such as the disclosure of financial performance) (on 
file with the American University Law Review). 
 7. A general comprehensive definition of fiduciary does not seem to exist.  See 
Weinrib, supra note 2, at 5 (stating that the designation of a company’s fiduciary is a 
“notoriously intractable problem”).  In fact, courts often are reluctant to define 
“fiduciary” to avoid the negative implication that relationships not included in the 
definition are excluded.  See, e.g., Harper v. Adametz, 113 A.2d 136, 139 (Conn. 
1955) (declining to define a fiduciary relationship in precise detail).  The definition 
of “fiduciary” in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS is circular in part, and it leaves 
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fiduciary relationships are well established; other relationships may 
give rise to fiduciary duties depending on the facts and circumstances 
of a particular situation.8  In all cases, fiduciaries can face conflicts 
between and among multiple principals the moment they agree to 
act on behalf of more than one.  Part I presents the existence of such 
conflicts and the manner in which they are purportedly resolved. 
A. The Problem 
Most fiduciaries act for more than one principal.  A trustee 
generally administers more than one trust; an attorney represents 
more than one client; a company director may sit on multiple boards.  
The Second Restatement of Agency provides, unless agreed, that an 
agent may not act for persons whose interests may conflict.9  But the 
Restatement also recognizes that some conflicts may not be 
foreseeable, and an agent may act for principals with conflicting 
                                                          
unanswered the question of when a fiduciary duty arises.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (1977) (defining a fiduciary relation as one that exists between 
two persons when one person is under a duty to act for the benefit of the other).  
Other courts also have expressed the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of 
formulating a definition of fiduciary to capture all cases.  See Steelvest, Inc. v. 
Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 485 (Ky. 1991) (stressing the impossibility 
of formulating a definition of a fiduciary relationship that would fully and adequately 
embrace all cases); Brown v. Foulks, 657 P.2d 501, 506 (Kan. 1983) (stating that it is 
difficult to define the term “fiduciary relation”).  A large body of literature has 
emerged addressing the characteristics of the fiduciary relationship.  See generally 
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 504 (1996) (identifying the primary function of 
the fiduciary duty as the constraint on exercising discretionary powers); Flannigan, 
supra note 2, at 297 (explicating that trust is a single source of the obligation); Tamar 
Frankel & Wendy Gordon, Trust Relationships, 81 B.U. L. REV. 321, 323-24 (1981) 
(highlighting the role of trust in fiduciary relationships); Weinrib, supra note 2, at 7 
(identifying the hallmark of a fiduciary relation as one person’s commitment to 
another). 
 8. Conventional fiduciary relationships include trustee and beneficiary, attorney 
and client, guardian and ward, executor and heir, and director and shareholder.  
Examples of unconventional fiduciary relationships are stockbroker and customer, 
accountant and client, and director and bondholder.  See, e.g., Flannigan, supra note 
2, at 293-94 (noting that a fiduciary relationship is established where confidence or 
deferential trust is shown to exist); see also Cheryl Goss Weiss, A Review of the Historic 
Foundations of Broker-Dealer Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 23 J. CORP. L. 65, 112-14 
(1997) (examining whether brokers are fiduciaries).  Others use the terms formal 
and informal in place of conventional and unconventional.  See Smith, supra note 2, 
at 1412 & n.51 (labeling trustee-beneficiary, guardian-ward, partner-partner, 
director-shareholder, and attorney-client relationships as formal and general 
confidential relationships as informal); see also DeMott, supra note 1, at 909 
(discussing the unconventional aspect of fiduciary relationships). 
 9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 394 (1958); see also N.L.R.B. v. Amax 
Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1981) (arguing that the rule against a trustee 
dividing his loyalties must be rigidly enforced to deter the trustee from all temptation 
and to prevent any possible injury to the beneficiary). 
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interests if the agent did not intend to create a situation where a 
conflict may arise.10 
In what kinds of cases would a conflict between legitimate interests 
arise?  A fiduciary that offers even one service, such as a trustee or 
advisory service, may encounter conflicts the moment representation 
of multiple principals occurs.  Some of these conflicts present 
questions over how to allocate scarce resources.  Some have 
questioned whether a director who sits on eighty or one hundred 
boards can effectively monitor the activity of each.11  Similarly, one 
can ask if an attorney with multiple clients should spend time 
preparing one case over another.  An investment manager may be 
required to place a valuable investment in the account of one client 
and not another.  The same investment manager may also have to sell 
an illiquid security from several accounts, driving the price of that 
security down.  Determining which clients sell first, therefore, 
presents a conflict.12  Perhaps the clearest problem arises when a 
trustee sells assets from one account to another.  In that case, the 
trustee is both purchaser and seller.  As seller, the trustee seeks to sell 
dear, and as buyer, to buy low.13  A company director in the case of a 
                                                          
 10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 394 cmt. b (1958).  I shall not, in this 
Part, address conflicts of interest that arise when a fiduciary is motivated by self-
interest.  Much of fiduciary law, explored more fully in Part II, is based on how to 
ensure a fiduciary does not take advantage of opportunities for self-dealing.  The 
focus here, rather, is limited to situations where two or more principals have 
legitimate interests and the fiduciary is placed in the delicate role of determining 
which interest prevails.  This problem facing the fiduciary may be characterized as a 
distinction between conflicts of interest and conflicts of duty.  How can one blame a 
fiduciary in an untenable situation wanting to do the right thing?  Put this way, the 
focus is on the intent of the fiduciary as opposed to the consequences of the 
fiduciary’s actions.  It is little comfort to the fiduciary’s principal, however, that the 
fiduciary is not acting out of self-interest but rather in the interest of another 
principal.  This debate arises in the context of criminal law as well.  See generally 
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE:  BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON 
TRIAL 60-83 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1990) (1988) (discussing Goetz’s choice to shoot 
four men on the subway in light of his intent and the consequences of his actions). 
 11. Mutual Funds:  Trading Practices and Abuses That Harm Investors:  Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security of the Senate 
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4 (2003) (statement of Senator 
Collins). 
 12. See generally AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRACHTER, THE LAW 
OF TRUSTS §§ 169, 170 (4th ed. 1987 & Supp. 2000) (indicating that the most 
fundamental duty of trustee is the duty of loyalty owed to the beneficiaries of a trust 
and the duty of the trustee is to administer the trust for the sole interest of the 
beneficiaries). 
 13. The Uniform Trusts Act expressly forbids this practice.  See UNIF. TRUSTS ACT 
§ 6 (1937) (forbidding the trustee of one trust from selling property to itself as the 
trustee of another trust).  Most states, however, permit such transfers as long as the 
price is considered fair.  See GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND 
TRUSTEES § 543 (H) (1993) (noting that most states adopt a middle ground 
approach, where the transaction is unassailable by the beneficiaries unless there is 
unfairness); SCOTT & FRACHTER, supra note 12, at § 170.6 (forbidding straw 
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self-tender has a similar conflict because he represents both the 
company conducting the offer and the shareholders to whom the 
offer is directed.14  Striking a proper balance may be difficult. 
In other cases, striking a proper balance may be impossible.  Some 
fiduciaries face conflicts whereby acting to the benefit of one 
principal necessarily harms another.15  These cases may be considered 
strict conflicts because the fiduciary has a reason to take the action, 
but the same fiduciary also has a reason to refrain from taking the 
same action.16  Consider the example of a defense attorney 
representing two codefendants, both of whom claim they were not 
present at the scene of a crime.  A prosecution eyewitness testifies to 
seeing both individuals at the crime scene, but the witness’s memory 
is weaker with respect to the second.  The defense attorney is in a 
bind.  Attempts to impeach the witness’s testimony with respect to the 
second defendant will call attention to the fact that the witness’s 
testimony with respect to the first is sound.  Should the defense 
attorney question the witness and attempt to impeach or forgo cross-
examination? 
While representation of multiple principals may cause conflicts for 
a fiduciary that offers a unitary service, conflicts are more likely to 
arise when a fiduciary offers multiple services to multiple clients.17  
Organizations enhance their efficiency by offering multiple services, 
and courts recognize that large financial firms have done so for 
decades.18  The activities of many financial firms can be divided 
                                                          
transactions if they involve a third person, but not if they involve a fiduciary 
operating alone); Fiduciary Activities of National Banks Regulations, 12 C.F.R. 
§ 9.12(d) (1996) (allowing a national bank serving as fiduciary to sell assets between 
fiduciary accounts if the transaction is fair and not prohibited by applicable law).  
 14. See Eisenberg v. Chi. Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1057 (Del. Ch. 1987) 
(explaining that directors act as both the representatives of the corporation and the 
fiduciaries for the shareholder-offerees, giving rise to potential conflict on the part of 
the directors). 
 15. But cf. JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 188 (2002) (proposing that 
conflicts need not be mutually exclusive). 
 16. See id. at 25, 188 (postulating that conflicts of reason, which occur when the 
agent has reasons to perform and not to perform a certain act, should not necessarily 
preclude the pursuit of that act). 
 17. See TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND STEERING COMMITTEE ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
IN THE SECURITIES MARKETS, ABUSE ON WALL STREET:  CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE 
SECURITIES MARKETS 7 (1980) (noting that modern firms perform a “multiplicity” of 
functions, such as the execution of orders to buy and sell stocks, buy and sell bonds, 
provide investment advice, and underwrite new issues, which further complicate 
conflicts of interest); Note, Conflicting Duties of Brokerage Firms, 88 HARV. L. REV. 396, 
420 (1974) (recommending a system where the fiduciary, upon entering a 
confidential relationship, notifies customers that previous recommendations from an 
outside perspective will no longer be updated). 
 18. See In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 272 F. Supp. 
2d 243, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that the affiliation between mutual fund 
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roughly into two categories, investment banking and retail brokerage, 
and the cyclical nature of revenue from brokerage often is offset by 
more consistent revenues from investment banking.19  Offering 
multiple services, however, may present tensions in the organization 
and lead to conflicts between and among customers and clients.20  A 
firm that both underwrites securities and provides brokerage services, 
for example, faces competing claims of its clients.  Over forty years 
ago, the SEC noted that the variety of functions performed by 
securities firms—including underwriting and retail brokerage—
results in “multifarious possibilities of conflict of obligation or 
interest” since “each of these functions involves its own set of 
obligations to particular persons or groups of persons.”21  These 
conflicts are as salient today as they were in 1963.  The New Yorker 
recently noted: 
The overriding conflict is that most major firms . . . run both 
investment banks and brokerages.  Investment bankers help 
companies sell stocks and bonds.  Brokers help investors buy stocks 
and bonds.  Companies want to sell high, investors want to buy low.  
Companies want Wall Street to make them look good, investors 
want Wall Street to tell them which companies actually are good.  
When the same firm is advising both sides, someone is going to get 
a raw deal, even if everyone is acting honestly.22 
Recent federal and state actions against Jack Grubman, Henry 
Blodget, and ten large investment firms demonstrate conflicts that 
exist in financial firms.23  The investment banks exercised 
extraordinary and inappropriate influence over research analysts 
whose job it was to be objective seers of the facts.24 
                                                          
investment advisers and broker-dealers has been recognized for decades). 
 19. JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION:  CASES AND MATERIALS 214 (3d 
ed. 2001). 
 20. See NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION 31-38 (1995) 
(chronicling the potential conflicts of interest that arise in a multi-function financial 
firm). 
 21. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF 
SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. DOC. NO. 95, pt. I, at 439 (1st Sess. 1963) (discussing the 
emerging pitfalls in directorships and broker-dealer trading and calling for “vigilant 
concern for niceties of conduct”). 
 22. James Surowiecki, In Wall Street We Trust, THE NEW YORKER, May 26, 2003 at 
40. 
 23. See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 2841, 2004 WL 2075173 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2004) (detailing the case against Jack Grubman); In re Merrill 
Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Sec., No. 01 Civ. 6881,  2004 WL 305601 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2004) (detailing the case against Henry Blodget). 
 24. The SEC and the New York Attorney General alleged that the investment 
banking departments of ten large firms exercised improper influence over research 
to curry favor with certain companies and to generate investment banking business.  
See Joint Press Release, SEC, New York Attorney General, North American Securities 
Administrators Association, NYSE and NASD, Ten of Nation’s Top Investment Firms 
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Conflicts of duty can also arise when a company director takes on 
the function of a trustee, and trust assets are invested in the 
company’s stock or debt.25  The director-trustee may face tough 
choices between taking risk-enhancing steps to increase the price of 
the stock, thereby promoting the well-being of the company 
shareholders, and refraining from taking such steps to ensure the 
well-being of the trust beneficiaries, who typically are risk-averse.  
Similarly, a company officer may act as a trustee to a company 
pension plan and face similar conflicts between a duty to the 
company’s shareholders and a duty to the plan members.26 
Perhaps the most typical conflict results from the fiduciary’s duty of 
confidentiality.27  Certain services, such as banking, trust, or advisory 
services, place a high value on client confidentiality, while other 
services, such as underwriting or brokerage, require detailed 
disclosure.  A fiduciary offering two or more of these services may be 
pressed to disclose information to one client that another insists be 
kept confidential.  An attorney, for example, may learn of 
confidential information through the course of representation of one 
client that is vital to the representation of another.28  Similarly, a 
                                                          
Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and 
Investment Banking (Apr. 28, 2003) (summarizing the charges against the ten firms 
and introducing reforms to insure that the ties between brokerage and investment 
banking will be permanently severed), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/ 
2003-54.htm; see also Federal Court Approves Global Analyst Research Settlement, 
SEC Litig. Release No. 18438, 81 SEC Docket 1699, 1699 (Oct. 31, 2003) 
(summarizing the allegations of the SEC’s complaint and the terms of the 
settlement, wherein the firms agreed to pay approximately $1.4 billion and 
implement structural reforms), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/ 
lr18438.htm. 
 25. See Note, The Trust Corporation:  Dual Fiduciary Duties and the Conflict of 
Institutions, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 713, 717 (1961) (explaining that when two institutions 
share a common fiduciary a breach of duty is likely to occur because an act on behalf 
of one institution may not be in the best interests of the other). 
 26. Section 408(c)(3) of ERISA permits a company officer to act as a trustee for 
an ERISA pension plan, Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
§ 408(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (2004), but section 404(a)(1) provides that the 
plan must be administered “for the exclusive purpose of . . . providing benefits to 
participants and their beneficiaries.”  See Siskind v. Sperry Retirement Program, 47 
F.3d 498, 500 (2d Cir. 1995) (observing the appearance of a conflict of interest when 
ERISA trustees hold corporate offices); Donovan v. Bierwith, 538 F. Supp. 463, 468-
69 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (discussing the duties owed by a pension fund trustee who is also 
a company director, and the extent to which ERISA permits this overlap), aff’d, 680 
F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982) (Friendly, J.).  See generally David I. Weiss, Conflicts of Interest 
Arising Under ERISA’s Fiduciary Standards:  Can the Trustee Ever be Prudent, as Long as He 
Faces Dual Loyalties?, 9 NOVA L.J. 413, 413 (1985) (criticizing the enactment of § 
408(c)(3) of ERISA, which permits corporate officers to act as trustees for pension 
plans, and thus, allows the exposure of ERISA pension plans to loss of funds at the 
hands of disloyal corporate officers/trustees). 
 27. See generally Mitchell, supra note 2, at 478 (stressing that fiduciary 
relationships are based on trust and loyalty). 
 28. See Lauren Cohen, Note, In-House Counsel and the Attorney-Client Privilege:  How 
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company director serving on multiple boards may learn of 
confidential information from one that would be beneficial to 
another.29  Our instincts tell us that the director should keep the 
information of the first confidential, but why is this the case if doing 
so does a disservice to the second?30  A company director who serves 
as a trustee and invests trust assets in the company’s shares similarly 
may be privy to non-public information bearing on the price of the 
shares.  If the trustee learns that the company is doomed, is the 
trustee duty-bound to sell?  Is selling the shares permitted, but not 
required? 
B. Approaches to Addressing Conflicts of Duty 
Current law has taken several approaches to resolving conflicts of 
duty, none of which is wholly satisfactory.  Five possible approaches, 
which find expression in the case law, are (i) balancing the interests; 
(ii) applying a property theory; (iii) applying the doctrine of actio 
libera in causa; (iv) determining which duty arose first; and (v) seeking 
the advice of a neutral third party to settle the conflict.  On occasion, 
two or more of these approaches are employed. 
1. Balancing the interests 
One approach to resolve a conflict of duty is to examine two 
interests, imagine placing them on a scale, and determine which is 
weightier.  The determination may turn on a number of factors, 
including the principals’ circumstances and the effects of a breach, 
but in any case the approach is subjective and depends on the weight 
the decision-maker assigns to the respective interests.  One might 
assume, for example, that if a court were to weigh the interest of a 
potentially innocent person from being wrongly convicted, on the 
one hand, and the interest of a deceased person in maintaining 
confidentiality, on the other, the scale would tilt in favor of the 
potentially innocent defendant.  But that is not the case.   
                                                          
Sarbanes-Oxley Misses the Point, 9 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 297, 316-17 (2004) (stating that 
ethical issues exist for lawyers with regard to confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and 
independence). 
 29. See Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 
26323, 69 Fed. Reg. 3472-01, 3473-01 (Jan. 15, 2004) (questioning whether it would 
be appropriate, in the context of mutual funds, to restrict the number of boards on 
which a director serves to reduce the dissemination of confidential information), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ic-26323.htm. 
 30. See John K. Wells, Multiple Directorships:  The Fiduciary Duties and Conflicts of 
Interest that Arise When One Individual Serves More Than One Corporation, 33 J. MARSHALL 
L. REV. 561, 568-69 (2000) (explaining that directors of two corporations must 
consider what acts are in the best interest of both companies). 
LABY.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 2/4/2005  3:36:12 PM 
2004] RESOLVING CONFLICTS OF DUTY 87 
Some courts will go to great lengths to protect attorney-client 
confidentiality in the face of competing interests.31  In Arizona v. 
Macumber,32 the defendant was found guilty of murder and sentenced 
to life imprisonment.  During his defense, Macumber’s attorney 
sought to introduce evidence of a confession that another person, 
who in the meantime had died, had committed the same crime for 
which Macumber was being tried.33  The trial court, however, refused 
to admit the evidence on the grounds that it was privileged.34  
Macumber appealed and the Arizona Supreme Court believed that 
the interests at stake had been weighed by the legislature, which 
determined that confidentiality was more important.35  The court 
recognized that maintaining confidentiality would result in an 
injustice, but it believed the legislature considered this consequence 
when it balanced the interests.36  In the end, the court reversed the 
conviction on other grounds,37 but it opted to maintain the 
                                                          
 31. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (claiming that the 
attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential 
communications in the common law); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 
242 (1986) (highlighting attorney-client confidentiality as a central tenet of the 
attorney-client relationship in common law countries and in every state in the United 
States); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2000) (justifying the 
privilege on numerous policy grounds, such as facilitating fact development in a 
dispute necessary for the proper representation of the client and encouraging 
otherwise reticent clients to seek legal advice); Susan R. Martyn, In Defense of Client-
Lawyer Confidentiality . . . and its Exceptions, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1320, 1323-30 (2003) 
(advancing utilitarian and deontological justifications for the privilege). 
 32. 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976). 
 33. Macumber’s attorney did not represent the deceased, and therefore, did not 
face a direct conflict between maintaining the confidentiality of the deceased and 
acting on behalf of his client.  Id. at 1086.  The deceased instead had been 
represented previously by two attorneys who were present for Macumber’s trial. Id.  
The attorneys were willing to testify for Macumber that their client previously had 
confessed to the murders for which Macumber was accused.  Id. 
 34. See id. (holding that only the client, or an authorized person of the client, 
may claim the privilege, and that another person may assert the privilege only where 
the privileged person is absent). 
 35. Id.  The court first established that absent a waiver, an attorney may not be 
examined about any attorney-client communication, even if the client is deceased.  
Id.  Next, the court held that under the circumstances of this case, waiver by the 
client’s attorney was insufficient.  Id.  It is still the case that the attorney-client 
privilege survives the death of the client.  While in some cases a personal 
representative, such as an executor, may waive the privilege on behalf of the client, 
those cases are generally limited to circumstances to benefit the estate and where the 
client, if alive, would readily consent to waiver.  See Mayorga v. Tate, 752 N.Y.S.2d 
353, 353-56 (App. Div. 2002) (noting that the right to waive one’s interest in a 
deceased client’s estate survives the death of the client, and may be exercised by the 
decedent’s personal representative, in much the same way that the attorney-client 
privilege survives the death of the client for whose benefit the privilege exists). 
 36. Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1086. 
 37. See id. (holding that the trial court erroneously excluded expert testimony 
offered by defendant). 
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confidentiality of the dead client and bar the evidence of the 
confession. 
In the famous case of Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of 
California,38 the court took the same approach by employing a 
balancing test to justify disclosure.  In that case, the court had to 
resolve a conflict between two legal duties owed by a therapist:  the 
duty to a patient to maintain confidentiality and the duty to a 
potential victim to prevent harm.39  The court recognized the public 
interest in safeguarding confidential communications between a 
psychotherapist and patient, but it stated, “Against this interest, 
however, we must weigh the public interest in safety from violent 
assault.  The Legislature has undertaken the difficult task of 
balancing the countervailing concerns.”40  The court ruled that 
confidentiality had to yield to the extent that that disclosure was 
necessary to avert danger to others.41  While Tarasoff is not strictly a 
conflict of fiduciary duties, it illustrates the use of a balancing test to 
decide difficult cases. 
Determining which interest is weightier is subjective.  Soft interests 
such as preserving confidentiality or preventing injustice are not 
readily quantifiable.  Assigning weights to such interests is 
tantamount to adopting a conclusion during what is supposed to be a 
process for reaching one.  In fact, Justice Holohan in Macumber 
believed that the scales tilted in favor of breaching confidentiality in 
furtherance of Macumber’s defense.  Justice Holohan also claimed to 
weigh the competing interests, but he determined that the interest in 
presenting a defense outweighed the interest in confidentiality.  He 
argued that “[t]he problem of balancing competing interests, 
privilege versus a proper defense, is a difficult one, but the balance 
always weighs in favor of achieving a fair determination of the 
cause.”42  Justice Holohan stated that a claim of privilege “may have to 
give way when faced with the necessity of the accused to present a 
defense.”43 
The approaches of both the majority and concurring opinions in 
Macumber are unappealing.  If applied generally, Holohan’s approach 
would create significant exceptions to the attorney-client privilege 
because an attorney could always claim that disclosure of one client’s 
confidentiality was necessary to achieve a “fair determination of the 
                                                          
 38. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
 39. Id. at 345-46. 
 40. Id. at 346. 
 41. Id. at 347. 
 42. Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1088 (Holohan, J., concurring). 
 43. Id. 
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cause.”  But while Holohan’s approach is not satisfactory, one has a 
negative reaction to the majority opinion as well.  It seems 
preposterous that the statement of the deceased should be excluded 
and that, as a result, Macumber could have been convicted of crimes 
he did not commit.  Like the innocent priest in Alfred Hitchcock’s “I 
Confess,” who faced conviction because he was unwilling to break the 
seal of confession,44 in Macumber, a potentially innocent defendant 
faced conviction as well.   
2. Applying a property theory 
In weighing the interests in Macumber, Justice Holohan also 
invoked a property theory.  Holohan stated that once the client had 
died, he could not be prosecuted for other crimes, and any privilege 
was “merely a matter of property interest.”45  He went on to say that 
opposed to the property interest is the “vital interest” of the accused 
in defending himself.  Holohan argued that “the constitutional right 
of the accused to present a defense should prevail over the property 
interest of a deceased client in keeping his disclosures private.”46  
Invoking a property theory, however, suffers from several infirmities 
in this context.  First, it is unclear why the property interest 
articulated by Justice Holohan should be any less important than a 
constitutional interest.  The United States Constitution places a value 
on property as well.  The just compensation clause of the Fifth 
Amendment is evidence of that valuation,47 as is the contracts clause 
in Article I, Section 10.48  Second, determining when a property 
interest exists, like a balancing test, is subjective and conclusory.  
Labeling an interest “property” is a legal conclusion, not a basis for 
the conclusion.  While familiar to judges and lawyers steeped in the 
common law, property is simply a term used to represent a set of 
interests that merit protection.49 
                                                          
 44. I CONFESS (Alfred Hitchcock 1953). 
 45. Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1088. 
 46. Id.; see Roberta Romano, Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, “Contract and 
Fiduciary Duty,” 36 J.L. & ECON. 447, 448-49 (1993) (discussing a property theory of 
fiduciary duties). 
 47. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 48. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; LAURENCE TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 10-11 
(1985) (noting a constitutional commitment to the institution of property and its 
contractual expectations); see also Washington Legal Found. v. Texas Equal Access to 
Justice Found., 94 F.3d 996, 1000 (5th Cir. 1996) (declaring that property is defined 
by state law and protected against the government by the Constitution); 
CHRISTOPHER M. DUNCAN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS AND EARLY AMERICAN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT 44 (1995) (stating that historically property merited protection as a means 
by which an individual entered the public realm and as a source of independence 
and citizenship). 
 49. See RESTATEMENT OF PROP. Ch. 1, introductory note (1936) (giving an even 
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Not surprisingly, therefore, the presence of a property interest 
does not lead to a particular conclusion and can be used to justify 
different results in a single case.  A court can view property as the less 
important interest compared to other values such as justice or 
fairness.  If that is the case, once a court designates a property 
interest, it can rule, as Justice Holohan did in the Macumber case, that 
the interest in “mere property” ought to be ignored.  Alternatively, if 
a property interest is viewed as more important than other 
considerations, the presence or absence of property will cause a court 
to rule for or against a party.  This was the result in Siskind v. Sperry 
Retirement Program,50 which involved dual fiduciary duties under the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).51  In that 
case, plan trustees for the Sperry Retirement Program also were 
corporate officers and excluded plan participants from an early 
retirement incentive program in the course of a merger.52  The court 
stated that the employees had no “property right” in the plan and 
their fiduciary duties were not violated.53  Other than referring to the 
employer’s discretion in creating additional benefits under the plan, 
however, the court did not explain why no property right existed, or 
why the employer’s discretion was determinative. 
Conflicts of duty over whether to disclose confidential information 
may also be resolved by deeming the information property worthy of 
protection.  The Supreme Court, in an insider trading case, held that 
confidential information is a “species of property.”54  This theory was 
determinative in settling a conflict of duty in Cotton v. Merrill, Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith.55  In that case, a financial firm, through an 
investment banking relationship, received positive confidential 
information about a company, but failed to disclose the information 
                                                          
broader definition to the term property to include “legal relations between persons” 
with respect to tangible and intangible things); 73 C.J.S. Property § 4 (1983) (stating, 
“In legal usage the word ‘property’ . . . may signify either the subjective matter in 
which rights or interests exist, or it may signify valuable rights and interests protected 
by law, or it may signify both . . . .”); see also Metro. Opera Ass’n, Inc. v. Wagner-
Nichols Recorder Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483, 493 (1950) (explaining that “property 
rights” should be thought of as legal conclusions because they are protected from the 
intrusion of others by the courts); Gareth Jones, Unjust Enrichment and the Fiduciary’s 
Duty of Loyalty, 84 LAW Q. REV. 472, 485 (1968) (analyzing Phipps v. Boardman, 2 A.C. 
46 (H.L. 1967), and stating that distinguishing between “property” and “equitable 
property” does not solve the question of whether the parties were unjustly enriched). 
 50. 47 F.3d 498 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 51. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1461 (2004). 
 52. Siskind, 47 F.3d at 507. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987) (holding that 
confidential information acquired or compiled by a corporation is a species of 
property to which the corporation has the exclusive right and benefit). 
 55. 699 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Okla. 1988). 
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to investors before they sold their shares.56  The court held that the 
plaintiffs could not prove the firm breached a duty, stating that the 
confidential information was the firm’s property and could not be 
shared.57  But calling the interest property and worthy of protection 
does not address why the investor-clients of the firm should be 
denied access to the information to which they believed they were 
entitled.  Why was the firm not depriving the investors of their 
property interest as well? 
3. Determining the actio libera in causa 
A third approach used to resolve a conflict of duties is to examine 
whether the fiduciary, attempting to escape blame for a breach of 
duty, inappropriately created the situation giving rise to a conflict.  If 
the fiduciary claims that there was no choice but to engage in what is 
normally culpable conduct, a court may reject the claim if the 
fiduciary caused the conditions of this defense.  A common 
illustration of causing the condition of one’s own defense is the 
intoxicated actor who commits a crime.  The defendant argues that 
the crime occurred while the defendant was intoxicated, and 
therefore, the defendant’s mental state is similar to that of a person 
who is insane or incompetent.  The difference, of course, is that the 
intoxicated actor is responsible for being intoxicated or, in other 
words, responsible for being inculpable.58  The action (in this case 
                                                          
 56. Id. at 256. 
 57. Id. (quoting Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 26).  The case was brought as a private 
action alleging that Merrill Lynch handled the sale of the plaintiffs’ stock in a 
company called United Energy Resources shortly before United Energy merged with 
Midcon Corporation, which caused the share price to rise.  Id. at 253.  The decision 
does not specify whether the trades were solicited or unsolicited, although use of the 
phrase “handled the sale” suggests that the transactions were not solicited.  Id.  The 
plaintiffs alleged that Merrill Lynch knew about the pending merger because it was 
also a financial advisor to both United Energy and Midcon, but failed to disclose to 
the plaintiffs material information about the merger.  Id.  The plaintiffs alleged that 
Merrill breached its fiduciary duty by defrauding the investors with respect to their 
sale of United Energy stock.  Id.  The court stated that “courts have established that 
brokers have a primary obligation not to reveal inside information to clients for the 
clients’ benefit in trading securities.”  Id. at 256.  The court concluded that even if it 
assumed the existence of “conflicting fiduciary obligations, there can be no doubt 
which is primary here.”  Id. (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release 
No. 6668, 40 SEC Docket 907, 916 (Nov. 8, 1961)).  The presence of a property 
interest assumes additional importance where one can claim—as the court did 
here—that disclosure could lead to prosecution for depriving others of their 
property.  Id. 
 58. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One’s Own Defense, 71 VA. 
L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1985) (noting that most jurisdictions do not allow an intoxication 
defense when the defendant chose to become intoxicated); cf. Dr. Heinz-Dietrich, 
Epilepsy Its Place as a Legal Defense, 16 MED. & L. 413, 416 (1997) (explaining that an 
epileptic who suffers an epileptic attack while driving and causes harm may defend 
losing control of the vehicle so long as the epileptic was not aware of the condition 
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committing a crime) was free in its origin or free in its cause—actio 
libera in causa—and therefore culpable, even if not free in its 
execution.59 
It is easy to see the role this doctrine can play in conflict of duty 
cases.  A fiduciary, who creates a situation where a conflict has arisen, 
may seek to avoid culpability for a breach of duty to one principal by 
arguing that there was no choice but to breach the duty.  One could 
argue, however, that the fiduciary is blameworthy for creating the 
situation in the first place.  Thus, one way to resolve a conflict of duty 
is to bar a defense to a breach of duty claim if the defense is based on 
actions taken at an earlier time that could have been avoided.  The 
actor will not be permitted to defend an allegedly culpable act by 
arguing that a breach of duty to one of the principals was inevitable. 
Courts seem to take this approach in a line of cases involving 
financial firms.  In the California case Black v. Shearson, Hammill & 
Company,60 the issue was whether a brokerage firm that had material 
negative non-public information about a company, because a 
member of the firm sat on the company’s board, was required to 
disclose the information to brokerage customers investing in the 
company’s shares.61  The firm argued it should not be liable for non-
disclosure because it had a fiduciary duty to the company client not 
to reveal confidential information.62  The court ruled that it lacked 
sufficient reason “for permitting a person to avoid one fiduciary 
                                                          
before the attack occurred). 
 59. See Leo Katz, Before and After:  Temporal Anomalies in Legal Doctrine, 151 U. PA. 
L. REV. 863, 880-81 (2003) (explicating the problem in a criminal law context where 
prohibitions require a specific intent and positing a paradoxical example where an 
actor may be able to bring about his desired end but avoid the prerequisites for 
liability); see also LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS:  EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND 
KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW 30-32 (1996) (analogizing the problem with a person 
who buys a painting he dislikes just so he may destroy it). 
 60. 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (Ct. App. 1968). 
 61. The brokerage firm, Shearson, had a partner named Dunbar, who also was a 
director of United States Automatic Merchandising Company (USAMCO).  Id. at 
158.  As part of its efforts to sell USAMCO shares, Shearson distributed press releases 
and reports containing positive representations about the company’s operations.  Id. 
at 159.  Some investors even were told that Dunbar’s service on USAMCO’s board 
put Shearson in a position to receive inside information.  Id.  Since Dunbar failed to 
disclose negative information to Shearson personnel, Shearson’s brokers continued 
to reiterate positive representations to its customers even after the situation at 
USAMCO was bleak. Id. 
 62. “The essence of the argument is that, as between [the member’s] conflicting 
duties, the duty of confidentiality he owed to [the company] as a director was higher 
than the duty he owed to Shearson’s customers as their broker.”  Id. at 161.  In 
support of its argument, Shearson cited, and the court considered, a New York Stock 
Exchange Educational Circular, which exhorted those in Dunbar’s position to 
“meticulously avoid any disclosure of inside information to his partners, employees 
of the firm, his customers or his research or trading departments.”  Id. (citing NEW 
YORK STOCK EXCHANGE EDUCATIONAL CIRCULAR NO. 162 (June 22, 1962)). 
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obligation by accepting another which conflicts with it.”63  The court 
continued, “The officer-director’s conflict in duties is the classic 
problem encountered by one who serves two masters.  It should not 
be resolved by weighing the conflicting duties; it should be avoided in 
advance . . . or terminated when it appears.”64  The firm, in other 
words, should not have put itself in the position where its member 
was able to obtain confidential information at the same time it was 
recommending purchase of the company’s shares to brokerage 
customers.  This parallels a case in which a firm solicited customers to 
purchase a company’s shares after the firm received adverse 
information about the company.  The district court held that the firm 
could not place itself in a conflict situation and then disregard its 
duty to one client: 
Shearson voluntarily entered into a fiduciary relationship with 
Tidal Marine, as a consequence of which it received confidential 
information.  Shearson also voluntarily entered into fiduciary 
relationships with its customers.  It cannot recognize its duty to the 
former while ignoring its obligation to the latter.  Having assumed 
fiduciary responsibilities, Shearson is required to incur whatever 
commercial disadvantage fulfillment of those obligations entails.65 
While this approach to resolving conflicts of duty is appealing, it is 
not sufficiently robust to address many types of cases.  It is often 
difficult or impossible to claim that the actor should not have placed 
himself in a situation where a conflict might arise.  In Arizona v. 
Macumber,66 for example, the attorneys for the deceased obtained 
confidential information from their client as part of performing their 
duty.  They could not have known at the time that the same 
information would assist in another’s defense, and even if they knew, 
they could not disregard their client’s statement.   
Another difficulty with this approach is determining at which point 
the actor is at fault in not foreseeing a potential conflict.  The process 
of creating the conditions that lead one to undertake the allegedly 
illegal action can entail several events, and the problem lies in 
determining for which event the actor is culpable.67  In Black, should 
one ask whether the individual firm member should have sat on the 
                                                          
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 94,329 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 1974). 
 66. 544 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Ariz. 1976). 
 67. See Robinson, supra note 58, at 9 (illustrating the difficulties in this problem 
with an example of an actor who has a defective muffler which throws off a spark and 
starts a forest fire). 
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issuer’s board, whether the firm should have solicited the purchase of 
the company’s shares while he was on its board, whether the firm 
should have made representations about the company while he was 
on the board, whether the individual himself should have made such 
representations, or whether he should have corrected his earlier 
representations if he subsequently learned that they were false? 
4. Determining which interest was present first 
In many cases, applying the doctrine of actio libera in causa does not 
work well because it is difficult to argue that actors are responsible for 
causing the conditions of their own defense.  Another approach 
attempts to determine which of the two competing interests arose 
first.  The idea here is that when a fiduciary agrees to act on behalf of 
a principal, the fiduciary agrees to put the interests of that principal 
first—“first in time, first in right.”68  And the principal may not have 
entered the relationship if he knew that the fiduciary would have a 
conflict with respect to other principals.  Thus, resolving conflicts in 
this manner is often accomplished by requiring consent by the first 
principal before a fiduciary can act on behalf of a second.  The 
Second Restatement of Agency provides, “Unless otherwise agreed, 
an agent is subject to a duty not to act or to agree to act during the 
period of his agency for persons whose interests conflict with those of 
the principal in matters in which the agent is employed.”69  The same 
is true for attorneys.  When addressing conflicts of duty between and 
among multiple clients, the general rule according to the Third 
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers is that conflicts are 
prohibited unless all affected clients consent.70 
The “first in time, first in right” rule has been applied to a company 
director who is subsequently named a trustee where the trust holds 
shares of the company.  In Rosencrans v. Fry,71 the court resolved this 
conflict by requiring the trustee to continue to satisfy the interests of 
the company’s shareholders before satisfying the interests of the 
beneficiaries.  In that case, a company officer (Fry), became a trustee 
for a testamentary trust that held the company’s shares.72  One of the 
                                                          
 68. Cf. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954) (explaining 
that for statutory liens, this widely-accepted principle grants satisfaction first to prior 
claims) (citing Ranking v. Scott, 25 U.S. 177, 179 (1827)). 
 69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 394 (1958). 
 70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 121 (2000). 
 71. 91 A.2d 162 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952), aff’d, 95 A.2d 905 (N.J. 1953). 
 72. The case concerned one-half of the estate of Charles Rosencrans, 
bequeathed to his wife Lee and to William Fry, in trust for the benefit of Lee and 
Rosencrans’s two nephews.  Id. at 163-64.  This portion of the estate included all of 
Rosencrans’s stock in a company that he organized.  Id. at 164.  Fry managed the 
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beneficiaries (Lee Rosencrans, the testator’s wife) claimed that Fry 
should have caused the company to declare greater dividends 
between the time of the testator’s death and the time that Fry, 
pursuant to an option provided by the will, purchased the shares.73  
Fry’s failure to cause the company to declare greater dividends, Lee 
claimed, constituted a breach of duty as trustee.74  The court noted, 
“It is obvious that the duty as director and the duty as trustee might in 
some cases lead in different directions.  They must be composed 
upon some rational basis.”75  In resolving the case in Fry’s favor, the 
court pointed out that Lee and Fry were on the board of directors 
and had approved dividends and other company policies.76  She 
objected only after Fry sought to purchase the shares pursuant to his 
option.77  The court noted that long before Fry became a trustee, the 
company did not distribute all of its earnings to shareholders—it 
retained earnings for business purposes.78  The testator, therefore, 
must have contemplated that some of the earnings would be retained 
for operations and expansion, and both Lee and Fry agreed early on 
that the company should continue to expand.79 
The court recognized that in voting shares of stock, trustees 
typically have a duty to promote the interests of the beneficiaries.80  
But this doctrine, the court said, “does not embrace a duty to advance 
the interest of the beneficiary at the expense of the corporation and 
other outstanding stockholders’ interests.”81  The court, however, 
                                                          
company and sat on the board of directors.  Id. at 166.  In his will, Rosencrans also 
gave Fry the right to purchase the shares in the trust corpus for twenty-five dollars 
per share.  Id. at 163.  Much of the litigation surrounded the right of Fry to purchase 
the shares, but the court also addressed Lee’s claim that Fry should have been 
required to account to her for earnings of the company that accrued between the 
date of Rosencrans’s death and the date Fry exercised his right to purchase.  Id. at 
165.  For a discussion of this case, see Frank T. Becker, Control of Trust-Held 
Companies, 19 J. CORP. L. 41, 53-55 (1993) and Note, The Trust Corporation:  Dual 
Fiduciary Duties and the Conflict of Institutions, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 713, 720-21 (1961). 
 73. Rosencrans, 91 A.2d at 164. 
 74. The court recognized the difficult spot in which the trustee found himself.  
Id. at 165.  The court stated that Fry “was also a director of the company and was 
saddled with the duties of that office.  It is impossible to evaluate the performance of 
his duty as trustee under the will without taking into account the propriety of his 
performance as director of the company.”  Id. at 165-66.  The court expressed that 
the difficulty in the case arose not because the trustee placed himself in a conflict 
situation, but rather, from a potential conflict “which the testator himself created.”  
Id. at 166. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 166-67. 
 78. Id. at 167. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 168. 
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sidestepped the issue of determining which interest should prevail.82  
The court could have concluded that a trustee’s duty to a beneficiary 
prevails over a company director’s duty to shareholders.  Ample 
authority supports the proposition that the duty of a trustee to the 
beneficiaries of a trust is more important than the duty of a company 
director to the shareholders.83  Instead of ruling in the beneficiary’s 
favor, the court seemed to think that the trustee could act with 
“fairness” in discharging his duties to both principals, but it is hard to 
understand what fairness means in this context and why the meager 
dividends declared during the relevant period were fair to the 
beneficiaries. 
In addition to the unanswered questions raised in this case, 
attempting to determine which interest was present first would not 
help resolve many other cases.  While it might explain Arizona v. 
Macumber,84 where the duty of confidentiality to the deceased client 
arose long before the duty to provide a defense to Macumber, it 
would not assist in resolving the conflicts that arose in Black v. 
Shearson, Hammill & Company85 and Cotton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith.86  In those cases, emphasizing the timing of when a 
duty arose introduces arbitrariness into the cases that makes 
application of the principle unworkable.  Some brokerage or advisory 
clients may have established their relationship with the financial firm 
before it received confidential information and some after.  This 
would lead to the untenable situation where the firm would resolve 
conflicts with clients differently depending on when a particular 
relationship arose.  Not only would this be difficult to administer, it 
would result in similar clients being treated differently based on the 
arbitrary distinction of when their relationship with the firm 
commenced. 
5. Seeking the view of a neutral third party 
A fifth approach employed by courts to resolve conflicts of duty is 
to remove the yoke of decision from the parties and place it on a 
                                                          
 82. See Becker, supra note 72, at 53 (noting that the court in Rosencrans did not 
give specific guidelines for trustee-managers to resolve potential conflicts of interest). 
 83. See, e.g., Prueter v. Bork, 435 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (asserting 
that the duty of loyalty owed to a beneficiary by a trustee is the most important of any 
fiduciary relationship); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (1959) (“The 
duties of a trustee are more intensive than the duties of some other fiduciaries.”); 
SCOTT & FRACHTER, supra note 12, at § 170 (“In some relations the fiduciary element 
is more intense than others; it is peculiarly intense in the case of a trust.”). 
 84. 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976). 
 85. 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (Ct. App. 1968). 
 86. 699 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Okla. 1988). 
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neutral third party with the information and distance to decide the 
conflict objectively.  Courts adopting this approach display a 
paternalistic view that parties faced with a conflict are incapable of 
resolving it on their own and should turn instead to the court or 
some other third party for guidance.  This sentiment is illustrated in 
Shanley’s Estate v. Fidelity Union Trust Company.87  In that case, a 
testamentary trust included stock of a subsidiary company, and 
certain directors of the subsidiary’s parent were also directors of the 
trustee company.88  The parent sought to merge with the subsidiary, 
and it offered to purchase the shares of the subsidiary from the 
trust.89  The trust beneficiaries objected to the sale, but several 
directors of the trust company, who also were directors of the parent, 
supported it.90  The directors who served on both the board of the 
trust company and the board of the parent were presented with a 
conflict.  They owed a duty to the parent to purchase shares of the 
subsidiary, held by the trust, on the most favorable terms possible; 
they also owed a duty to the heirs to refrain from selling the shares 
because the heirs opposed the sale.91  The court stated, “The directors 
of our trustee are in conscience bound to consider only the welfare of 
our wards and strive for the best price obtainable; as directors of the 
[parent], their duty is no less to secure the most favorable terms.  The 
true balance is infinite.”92  The opinion at least twice suggested the 
parties contact the court for advice.  The court noted, “In the 
dilemma in which it found itself, the course open to our trustee was 
to apply to the court for instructions, not to compel our wards to 
appeal for protection.”93  The court did not permit the sale and 
concluded that the trustee “may shift the responsibility to the court 
by asking instructions.”94 
While seeking outside advice may have provided for certainty in 
Shanley’s Estate, applying such an approach across-the-board is 
impractical.  First, in many cases, a fiduciary faced with a conflict of 
duty must make a quick decision—time is a luxury not afforded an 
attorney in the heat of trial or a financial adviser faced with dynamic 
market conditions.  Second, requiring a fiduciary to seek the advice 
of a third party each time a conflict arose would be burdensome.  
                                                          
 87. 138 A. 388 (N.J. Ch. 1927). 
 88. Id. at 388. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 389. 
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While third parties such as ethics committees may establish hot-lines 
or other avenues to render informal advice, they likely do not 
anticipate being called upon to make decisions each and every time a 
conflict arises.  Third, even if a third party renders a decision, there is 
no guarantee a court will agree.95  Finally, seeking such prospective 
relief is generally inconsistent with our system of justice.  Where 
parties disagree in retrospect, they call upon courts to decide their 
case, but courts typically do not make such decisions prospectively.  It 
is the nature of the judicial process to settle disputes based on events 
that occurred in the past and establish general rules as instruments of 
social control, not to provide prospective advice to individual 
parties.96 
Each of the five approaches identified fails as a consistent means to 
address conflicts of duty and account for the outcomes in the cases.  
One approach is to weigh competing interests, but that approach is 
too subjective, and other courts specifically reject it.97  Some courts 
look for a property interest, but that seems to sidestep the analysis 
that allows those courts to reach the conclusion that a property 
interest exists and merits protection.  Still other courts seem to take 
the view that a fiduciary should not create a conflict situation and 
then seek to avoid blame for taking actions that might otherwise be 
viewed as culpable—actors may not cause the conditions of their own 
defense.  But not all conflicts of duty arise as a result of poor 
foresight.  Other approaches—first in time, first in right, and relying 
on a third party decision-maker—are inadequate.  In order to 
determine how courts resolve conflicts of duty, I shall explore more 
deeply the nature of the duties that the fiduciary owes its principals.  
Only after distinguishing between the duties can one make sense of 
the courts’ rulings. 
II. LOYALTY AND CARE 
Part I explored conflicts between duties owed to multiple 
principals and outlined various approaches to addressing those 
                                                          
 95. See, e.g., Arizona v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084, 1087 (Ariz. 1976) (Holohan, J., 
concurring) (emphasizing that, although the parties in that case had sought and 
received an opinion from the Committee on Ethics of the State Bar about a legal 
issue, the court ignored the Committee’s advice). 
 96. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121 (1984) (“If it were not possible to 
communicate general standards of conduct, which multitudes of individuals could 
understand, without further direction, as requiring from them certain conduct when 
occasion arose, nothing that we now recognize as law could exist.”). 
 97. See, e.g., Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 72 Cal. Rptr. 157, 161 (Ct. App. 
1968) (rejecting a balancing test in favor of either avoiding the conflict in advance or 
terminating it once it appears). 
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conflicts.  What makes these cases difficult is that the courts were 
faced with competing claims of a different nature—a claim by one 
principal not to be harmed by the fiduciary and a claim by another to 
be helped, but helping the second in each case entailed harming the 
first.  This Part demonstrates that these two competing claims reflect 
a tension between satisfying the duty of loyalty and promoting the 
duty of care, duties that wind around each other like a double helix 
comprising the fiduciary obligation.98  To illustrate this tension, this 
Part examines the character of the duties.  Once the difference 
between the two duties is established, Part III shall discuss how courts 
apply these principles and enforce the duty of loyalty, even if it results 
in a breach of the duty of care. 
A. The Duty of Loyalty 
An agreement to enter into a fiduciary relationship generates the 
fiduciary’s duty of loyalty.99  One may begin, therefore, by considering 
what a relationship of loyalty entails.  Consider the characteristics of a 
relationship that results from a promise to keep a secret.  First, the 
promise implies negative action on the part of the promisor; the 
promisor agrees to refrain from acting against the other’s wishes by 
refraining from disclosing a secret.  Second, the promise represents 
an ongoing commitment; the promisor agrees to keep the secret not 
only for the time being but also for an extended, usually open-ended, 
period.  Third, the promise requires (or may require) a sacrifice; one 
promises to keep a secret even at the risk of some hardship and only 
                                                          
 98. See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 75 (1991) 
(announcing that a fiduciary’s duties consist of both a duty of care and a duty of 
loyalty); Cent. States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Trans., 
Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 572 (1985) (stating that ERISA trustee’s fiduciary standards of 
loyalty and care are borrowed from common law); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 
634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993) (“Duty of care and duty of loyalty are the traditional 
hallmarks of a fiduciary who endeavors to act in the service of a corporation and its 
stockholders.”); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) 
(categorizing the duty to exercise an informed business judgment as falling under 
the duty of care, rather than under the duty of loyalty); see also Langbein, supra note 
1, at 655 (proclaiming, “The law of fiduciary administration . . . resolves into two 
great principles, the duties of loyalty and prudence.”); E. Norman Veasey, The 
Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in America, 52 BUS. LAW. 393, 397 (1997) 
(charging directors, as fiduciaries, with the duties of loyalty and care to both the 
corporation and its stockholders). 
 99. The fiduciary’s duty of loyalty is a legal duty.  But one often uses the word 
“loyalty” to depict non-legal relationships, such as loyalty to one’s school or one’s 
colleague.  In fact, to preserve relationships of loyalty, legal requirements are often 
set aside, such as the requirement to testify against a spouse, a client, or a patient.  See 
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY:  AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS 47 
(1993) (distinguishing criminality, where the law requires a link between the 
outward act and internal intention, and morality, where the importance lies in 
“whether the bond of love, friendship, or trust is breached or maintained.”). 
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after placing one’s own interests second (one who agrees to keep a 
secret only until doing so causes personal hardship is hardly 
considered loyal).  Finally, a promise to keep a secret is 
unambiguous.  While disclosure may be permitted in some cases, the 
nature of the undertaking is clear-cut and the relationship is 
tarnished or ends from an unauthorized disclosure.  Each of these 
elements—an ongoing commitment not to act against another’s 
interests, maintained at personal sacrifice, and unbending in 
nature—characterizes loyalty.   
While a duty of loyalty often includes a commitment not to disclose 
the secrets of another, it means more in the fiduciary context.  It also 
includes not making use of the principal’s information or other 
resources for one’s own advantage (or the advantage of a third 
person) because such use may harm the principal.  Thus, the 
fiduciary may not take advantage of the principal—an important 
component of any relationship of loyalty.100 
1. The nature of the duty of loyalty 
The negative component of the fiduciary duty is captured by the 
duty of loyalty.  Under the heading, “Duty of Loyalty,” the Second 
Restatement of Trusts states that the fiduciary “is under a duty not to 
profit at the expense of the beneficiary and not to enter into 
competition with him without his consent, unless authorized to do 
so.”101  Similarly, the Second Restatement of Agency provides that the 
duty of loyalty entails a duty not to make a profit on transactions 
conducted for the principal102 or deal with the principal as an adverse 
party.103  In his celebrated treatise, John Norton Pomeroy wrote about 
the relationship between a trustee and a beneficiary, and divided the 
                                                          
 100. See, e.g., Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 677 N.E.2d 159, 182 (Mass. 
1997) (explaining that the duty of loyalty requires a corporate officer to disclose 
before taking advantage of a corporate opportunity or engaging in self-dealing); 
Folkin v. Cole, 548 N.E.2d 795, 808 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (suggesting that a director 
breaches his fiduciary duty to the corporation by taking advantage of a business 
opportunity belonging to the corporation).  One is accustomed to thinking about 
loyalty as a relationship among three parties.  A is said to be disloyal to B if A shares 
B’s secrets with C, who is lurking in the background as a potential competitor to B.  
See FLETCHER, supra note 99, at 8 (insisting that three parties always exist in a loyalty 
dilemma).  But a loyalty matrix can include two people when the self-interest of one 
of them puts the relationship in peril.  Consider an example where A and B are 
supposedly in a loyal relationship and where A learns of a potential opportunity that 
could benefit either.  A shares the information with B, and B, without telling A, 
selfishly seeks the opportunity.  While it may be unclear whether B must promote A’s 
obtaining the opportunity, loyalty at a minimum requires forbearance by B. 
 101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 cmt. a (1959). 
 102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 (1958). 
 103. Id. § 389. 
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discussion of the duty of loyalty (which he calls good faith) into four 
categories—all negative.104  Leading cases in corporate law distinguish 
negative from positive duties,105 and the duty of loyalty often is 
considered a duty against self-dealing.106  A classic treatment of the 
corporate director’s duty of loyalty provides, “The basic principle to 
be observed is that the director should not use his corporate position 
to make a personal profit or gain other personal advantage.”107  The 
same is true for lawyers.  Under the rubric of duties of loyalty, the 
Third Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers recognizes, “In 
general, they prohibit the lawyer from harming the client.”108  The 
Revised Uniform Partnership Act states that a partner’s duty of loyalty 
is limited to prohibitions against theft, self-dealing, and competing 
against the partnership.109 
While the nature of the fiduciary duty of loyalty is clear—a negative 
duty not to harm the principal—enforcing the duty is difficult 
because the ability to control the affairs or assets of another presents 
subtle opportunities for cheating or stealing that are hard to monitor.  
Courts, therefore, impose prohibitions or prophylactic rules to 
ensure that the fiduciary is not tempted to act selfishly.110 
                                                          
 104. See JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § VI, at 
§§ 1075-78 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941) (explaining that the duty of 
loyalty includes (1) the duty not to deal with trust property for one’s own advantage; 
(2) the duty not to commingle trust funds; (3) the duty not to accept a position, 
enter into a relation, or do any act inconsistent with the interests of the beneficiary; 
and (4) the duty not to sell trust property to oneself). 
 105. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Co., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 
1987) (obligating directors, under the duty of loyalty, with an affirmative duty to 
protect corporate interests and also with a duty to avoid conduct injurious to the 
corporation); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (requiring more 
than the absence of fraud or bad faith in order to fulfill one’s fiduciary duty); Guth v. 
Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (describing the duty of officers and directors as 
“not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation committed to his 
charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the 
corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage”). 
 106. See Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke, 724 A.2d 783, 789 (N.J. 1999) (noting that an 
employee’s self-dealing may breach the duty of loyalty owed to the employer). 
 107. The Corporate Director’s Guidebook, 33 BUS. LAW. 1591, 1599 (1978).  See generally 
Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees?  Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 
BUS. LAW. 35, 35-36, 75-76 (1966) (examining the history of legal rules regulating 
conflicts of interest and proposing legislative changes to improve their effectiveness). 
 108. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. e (2000) 
(proscribing the disclosure of sensitive information, lying, obtaining unfair contracts 
or gifts, sexual relations, abusing the client’s dependence, and risking the lawyer’s 
independent judgment). 
 109. REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(b) (1994); see Donald Weidner, The 
Revised Uniform Partnership Act Midstream:  Major Policy Decisions, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 
825, 857 (1990) (explaining that these duties are purportedly exclusive). 
 110. See SEC v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80, 92 (1942) (“Abuse of corporate position, 
influence, and access to information may raise questions so subtle that the law can 
deal with them effectively only by prohibitions not concerned with the fairness of a 
particular transaction.”); Frankel, supra note 1, at 1217-18 (elaborating on the high 
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Common law antecedents of such prophylactic rules date at least to 
the leading English case of Keech v. Sandford.111  In that case, a trustee 
held a lease for the benefit of an infant.112  When the lease was about 
to expire, the trustee attempted to renew it for the infant but the 
owner refused, so the trustee leased the property for himself.113  The 
chancery court, concerned with prohibiting a trustee from taking for 
himself a benefit belonging to the beneficiary, ruled that the trustee 
must hold the lease for the benefit of the infant:  “This may seem 
hard, that the trustee is the only person of all mankind who might 
not have the lease; but it is very proper that [the] rule should be 
strictly pursued, and not in the least relaxed . . . .”114 
Under the rule of Keech, the duty of loyalty represents a 
constraint—a legal disability—to which the fiduciary must adhere.115  
Early United States courts followed this rule.  In 1816, in Davoue v. 
Fanning,116 the New York Court of Chancery set aside a sale of real 
estate at a public auction by an executor acting as trustee when the 
buyer was the executor’s wife.  The chancellor said it was a “sound 
and settled doctrine” that a trustee may not have an interest in the 
sale of trust assets.117  Similarly, in 1846, in Michoud v. Girod,118 the 
Supreme Court overturned a purchase of property by two executors 
of a will, sold at public auction, even though the executors paid a fair 
price.  The executors were prohibited from considering on a case-by-
                                                          
cost of detecting fiduciaries’ misappropriation and fiduciaries’ temptations to steal); 
Langbein, supra note 1, at 640 (providing that the law previously addressed 
opportunism on the part of trustees by limiting their power, but this has been 
replaced by a new set of rules under the rubric of fiduciary administration). 
 111. 25 Eng. Rep. 223 (P.C. 1726).  For a discussion of this case, see Jones, supra 
note 49, at 474.  Establishing prophylactic rules to guard against temptation may be 
traced to the Old Testament.  In Genesis, God commanded that Adam not eat from 
the Tree of Knowledge.  Genesis 2:17.  When Eve repeated the command to the 
serpent, she embellished it, instead stating that God had said to Eve, “Ye shall not eat 
of it, neither shall ye touch it . . .”  Genesis 3:3.  In Rashi’s commentary on this 
passage, he explains that Eve added to God’s command, which did not forbid 
touching the tree but only eating its fruit, “therefore she was led to diminish from it.”  
PENTATEUCH AND RASHI’S COMMENTARY 13 (Dr. A.M. Silberman ed., 1946). 
 112. Keech, 25 Eng. Rep. at 223. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Jones, supra note 49, at 474 (“The courts attempt to prevent any breach of 
loyalty by imposing upon a fiduciary the most severe duty of loyalty; he must be 
safeguarded from any unhealthy temptation and deterred from the mere 
contemplation of profiting from his fiduciary position.”). 
 116. 2 Johns Ch. 252 (N.Y. Ch. 1816). 
 117. Id. at 257.  The court’s opinion has moral overtones.  The court observed that 
the doctrine is established “to remove the trustee from temptation” and that the 
remedy established “goes deep and touches the very root of evil.”  Id. at 261. 
 118. 45 U.S. 503 (1846). 
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case basis whether a transaction with the testator may be permissible; 
instead they were barred from transacting altogether: 
The disability to purchase is a consequence of that relation 
between them which imposes on the one a duty to protect the 
interest of the other, from the faithful discharge of which duty his 
own personal interest may withdraw him.  In this conflict of 
interest, the law wisely interposes.  It acts not on the possibility, 
that, in some cases, the sense of that duty may prevail over the 
motives of self-interest, but it provides against the probability in 
many cases, and the danger in all cases, that the dictates of self-
interest will exercise a predominant influence, and supersede that 
of duty.  It therefore prohibits a party from purchasing on his own 
account that which his duty or trust requires him to sell on account 
of another, and from purchasing on account of another that which 
he sells on his own account.119 
More recently, the Supreme Court recognized that the need for 
prophylactic rules arises not only from conscious temptations to act 
in one’s self-interest, but also by a tendency to act in accordance with 
unconscious bias.120 
Even if a transaction between a fiduciary and a principal exhibits a 
fair price, the transaction is prohibited.  This prohibition is the classic 
effect of a prophylactic rule:  certain transactions not of the type a 
rule was designed to prevent are nevertheless barred.  If a transaction 
exhibiting a fair price is prohibited, what about a transaction that 
results in a benefit to the principal?  In that case, the prophylactic 
rule would diminish the beneficiary’s well-being.  The Supreme Court 
addressed this situation in Magruder v. Drury.121  Real estate brokers 
named Arms & Drury transacted with a trust to which the same Drury 
                                                          
 119. Id. at 554-55. 
 120. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 191-92 (1963) 
(stating that the protections Congress created for the fiduciary clients of investment 
advisers were intended to eliminate or expose unconscious as well as conscious bias).  
Recent research suggests that decisions based on unconscious bias are common.  We 
make unconscious decisions to further our own self-interest even when we know we 
should avoid doing so.  According to this research, our desires influence the way we 
process information, even if we are trying to be objective.  See Max H. Bazerman et 
al., Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, HARV. BUS. REV. Nov. 2002, at 97, 98 (noting, 
“When we are motivated to reach a particular result, we usually do.”).  For example, 
well over half of survey respondents typically rate themselves above average in the 
areas of ethics, productivity, health, managerial ability, driving ability, and other 
skills.  Linda Babcock & George Lowenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse:  The Role 
of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 111 (1997).  Other research suggests that 
mere disclosure by a fiduciary of a conflict of interest may make matters worse.  
Disclosure of a conflict may inadvertently give the fiduciary implicit license to harm 
the principal more than if the disclosure had not been made, while failing to equip 
the principal with the necessary means to take the conflict of interest into account.  
Bazerman et al., supra note 120, at 101. 
 121. 235 U.S. 106 (1914). 
LABY.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 2/4/2005  3:36:12 PM 
104 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:75 
acted as trustee.122  The transactions were conducted in the regular 
course of business, and on terms that cost the estate “not a penny 
more” than any other firm.123  The Court noted that the relationship 
between the firm and the trustees actually benefited the estate by 
enabling the trustees to immediately reinvest trust assets with no loss 
of income.124  Nevertheless, the Court insisted on applying a 
prophylactic rule: 
It is a well-settled rule that a trustee can make no profit out of his 
trust.  The rule in such cases springs from his duty to protect the 
interests of the estate, and not to permit his personal interest to in 
any wise conflict with his duty in that respect.  The intention is to 
provide against any possible selfish interest exercising an influence 
which can interfere with the faithful discharge of the duty which is 
owing in a fiduciary capacity.125 
Modern fiduciary law reflects the rule of Michoud and Magruder.  It 
prohibits transactions between a fiduciary and his principal, even if 
the transaction would put the principal in a better position than he 
would have been in had the transaction not occurred.126 
                                                          
 122. Id. at 118. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 119. 
 125. Id.; cf. Ostic v. Mackmiller, 207 P.2d 1008, 1010-11 (N.M. 1949) (recognizing 
that transactions between guardians and wards, through which the guardian obtains 
a benefit, are presumptively invalid). 
 126. See, e.g., Marsh v. Gentry, 642 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1982) (refusing to uphold a 
transaction between a fiduciary and a principal, even though the principal arguably 
would have profited $75,000 from the transaction).  In that case, John Marsh and 
Tom Gentry formed a partnership to buy and sell horses for profit.  Id. at 575.  The 
partnership owned a mare named Champagne Woman and a foal of Champagne 
Woman named Excitable Lady.  Id.  The partnership consigned Champagne Woman 
for sale.  Id.  Then, without telling Marsh, Gentry, through a third person, bid on 
Champagne Woman and purchased her for $135,000.  Id.  The partnership put 
Excitable Lady up for sale and Gentry purchased her through a third person as well.  
Id. 
The court stated that partners must act with a high degree of good faith and 
disallowed the transactions.  Id. at 576.  The relevant Kentucky statute provided that 
a partner must account for and hold as trustee any benefit derived from a transaction 
connected with the partnership, if the benefit was derived without the consent of the 
other partners.  Id. at 575.  The court de-emphasized the pecuniary gain that could 
have resulted to the partnership and emphasized the secret undisclosed nature of 
the transactions.  Id. at 576.  The court recognized that Marsh obtained the 
stipulated purchase price but stated that “a partner has an absolute right to know 
when his partner is the purchaser.”  Id.  Partners scrutinize buy-outs by other 
partners, the court stated, differently than ordinary third party sales, and Marsh said 
he would not have consented to the sale had he known Gentry was the buyer.  Id. 
The dissent made plain that the partnership would have been better off as a result 
of Gentry’s purchase.  Id. at 578.  The bidding for Champagne Woman faltered at 
$60,000 when Gentry’s agent stepped in and bid $135,000.  Id.  The dissent stated, 
“Marsh was considerably better off financially with Gentry being the purchaser rather 
than if the horse had been sold off at $60,000.”  Id. 
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While most rules designed to ensure that the fiduciary is not 
tempted to engage in self-dealing are negative, the common law duty 
of loyalty also embodies certain subsidiary obligations that can be 
considered positive.  Thus, not all fiduciary duties of loyalty are 
strictly negative. 
Perhaps the most common positive duty designed to promote the 
duty of loyalty is a trustee’s obligation to earmark and segregate trust 
property.  A trustee must hold trust property in his representative 
capacity, not in his own name.127  The Second Restatement of Trusts 
provides that the trustee has a duty to keep the trust property 
separate from personal property and other property not subject to 
the trust, and to ensure that the property is designated as trust 
property.128  George Taylor Bogert explained that the reason for the 
rule is, “If a trustee is permitted to hold the trust res just as he holds 
his individual property, he may be subjected to a strong temptation to 
take the trust property for himself and allocate to the trust one of his 
own less advantageous pieces of property.”129  A simple example arises 
when a trustee holds both trust cash and personal cash, and the 
personal cash is stolen.  Under these circumstances, the trustee may 
be tempted to protect the personal cash by claiming that the trust 
cash was taken.130  “Men in extremity have been known to reach across 
every barrier of trust to take any monies or securities which could be 
converted to their salvation.”131 
One could, of course, reformulate the requirements to earmark 
and segregate trust assets as a negative duty not to mingle trust funds 
with personal funds, and the Restatement’s comments support this 
view.132  But fundamentally, the requirements to earmark and 
segregate are positive; they entail particularized actions the fiduciary 
must take.  A more difficult question is why duties to earmark and 
                                                          
 127. See BOGERT, supra note 13, at § 596 (explaining that the trustee’s duty to 
earmark requires him to hold trust property and assets in his capacity as trustee and 
not without mention of the trust); see also Lawyers Sur. Corp. v. Whitehead, 719 So. 
2d 824, 830 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (noting that Alabama imposes absolute liability on 
trustees for losses incurred by an investment when title is taken in the trustee’s 
personal capacity). 
 128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 179 (1957). 
 129. BOGERT, supra note 13, at § 596. 
 130. Id.; see also In re Union Trust Co. of N.Y., 149 N.Y.S. 324, 329 (Sur. Ct. 1914) 
(explaining that trustees cannot be trusted to hold trust property in their own name, 
as they would be tempted to use such property for their own profit).   
 131. In re Union Trust Co. of N.Y., 149 N.Y.S. at 329.   
 132. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 179 cmt. b (1957) (insisting that it is 
the duty of a trustee to keep trust funds separate from personal funds); id. § 179 cmt. 
c (maintaining that it is the duty of the trustee to refrain from mingling property 
held in different trusts); see also In re Union Trust, 149 N.Y.S. at 329 (holding that a 
trustee may not mingle trust property with his own property or other trust property). 
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segregate are not treated under the duty of care as positive duties, 
discussed below, as opposed to the duty of loyalty.  Indeed, in some 
contexts, such duties have been labeled a part of a fiduciary’s exercise 
of due care.133  While one could place the requirements to earmark 
and segregate under the rubric of due care, the rationale for the 
duties—avoiding temptation—seems to suggest they fit better under 
the duty of loyalty, which is first and foremost a duty against self-
dealing and other harmful conduct. 
2. The duty of loyalty as a perfect duty 
The application of prophylactic rules demonstrates that the 
fiduciary’s duty of loyalty is primarily a negative duty to be followed 
without exception and regardless of the benefits that may redound to 
the fiduciary or the principal.  Its philosophical underpinnings, in 
this sense, can be found in the writings of Immanuel Kant.  Kant 
divided all duties between perfect and imperfect duties, and the duty 
of loyalty may be categorized as a perfect duty, “a duty which permits 
no exception in the interest of inclination.”134 
Kant’s discussion of perfect duties informs the fiduciary’s duty of 
loyalty in two respects discussed above:  the negative aspect of the 
duty, and the clear-cut nature of the rules.135  First, perfect duties 
generally imply negative actions.  Kant addressed the delicate 
interplay between acting in self-interest and acting in accordance with 
principles that may be universalized.  Kant recognized that while one 
is capable of acting in accordance with principles that could be 
applied to everyone, at times one might respond to subjective 
conditions, applicable only to one or a small number of persons, and 
act in a way that cannot be universalized.136  Some actions, Kant said, 
one cannot think of making universal (let alone actually wanting the 
actions to become universal) without presenting an internal 
contradiction.137  It is these actions that one has a duty not to take.138 
                                                          
 133. See Custody of Investment Company Assets with a Securities Depository, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 25934 (Feb. 13, 2003) (adopting Investment 
Company Act rule 17f-4, 17 C.F.R. § 270.17f-4 (2004), governing a custodian’s 
holding of mutual fund assets, and eliminating the requirements of earmarking and 
segregating, and substituting other requirements, including a requirement that the 
fund’s custodian exercise “due care” to obtain and maintain financial assets).   
 134. IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 421 note 
(Lewis White Beck trans., Prentice-Hall 2d ed. 1990) (1785).  Page references are to 
the Academy Edition’s pagination. 
 135. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 136. KANT, supra note 134, at 412-13. 
 137. See id. at 424 (explaining that an internal contradiction is an irrationality in 
that “a certain principle [would be] objectively necessary as a universal law and yet 
subjectively [would] not hold universally but . . . [would] admit exceptions”). 
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Kant’s example is a person who considers borrowing money and 
promises to repay the loan knowing that repayment is impossible.139  
Kant asks if it is possible to universalize a proposition that would allow 
such conduct and concludes that such a universal proposition is 
laughable:  the notion of promises to pay would quickly collapse.140  
The promisor would be relying on a universal principle requiring 
repayment, while at the same time, making an exception only for 
himself.  He relies on the universal principle that one must keep 
promises to obtain the trust needed to receive a loan and then acts in 
contradiction to that principle. 
The second way that Kant’s discussion of perfect duties sheds light 
on the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty is that perfect duties, like duties of 
loyalty, are unambiguous.  Kant wrote that if a law cannot prescribe 
the precise way one must act and the extent of the actions, then the 
law results in an imperfect duty.141  He implies, therefore, that a law 
prescribing the precise actions that one must take, as well as the 
manner and extent of such actions, results in a perfect duty.142  A 
perfect duty, as noted, is one that “permits no exception in the 
interest of inclination.”143  Kant does not insist that perfect duties 
permit no exceptions, rather, he asserts that they do not permit 
exceptions in the interest of inclination.144  The reason for this 
conclusion is that an exception in the interest of inclination could be 
asserted arbitrarily as an afterthought.  A prohibition instead may be 
subject to limiting conditions that are not exceptions to a 
prohibition, but rather contained in the law itself.145 
                                                          
 138. Id. at 425. 
 139. Id. at 422. 
 140. Id. 
 141. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 390 (Mary Gregor trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797) (explaining that such a law leaves a “latitude for 
free choice,” in that it does not specify how one is to act or how much one is to do to 
fulfill a duty).  Page references are to the Academy Edition’s pagination. 
 142. See MARY GREGOR, LAWS OF FREEDOM 97 (1963) (“When the obligation is 
perfect (obligatio perfecta) the law obliges strictly (is stricte obligans):  when the 
obligation is imperfect the law is not of narrow but only of wide obligation (is late 
obligans).”). 
 143. KANT, supra note 134, at 421 note.   
 144. Id. 
 145. A passage in Kant’s Perpetual Peace supports this view.  See generally IMMANUEL 
KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE, in IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND 
OTHER WRITINGS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 347 (Lewis White Beck trans. & ed., Univ. of 
Chicago Press 1950) (1788).  Kant discussed the difference between a command, a 
prohibition, and a permission.  Kant criticized the use of a permission as an exception 
to a prohibition.  Rather, he argued for the concept of a permissive law, stating that 
permission should be introduced into a prohibition not as an exception, but as a 
limiting condition of the prohibition itself.  An exception is added arbitrarily, 
whereas a condition is introduced into the formula of the prohibition itself, and 
becomes a permissive law.  He wrote, “These exceptions are added to the law only as 
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Similarly, exceptions to the duty of loyalty generally are contained 
in the law itself.  The requirement that a fiduciary not transact with 
his principal absent consent serves as an example.  Consent is not an 
exception from the requirement to perform one’s duty that can be 
asserted as an afterthought; rather, the notion of consent is 
contained in the rule itself so that transacting with one’s principal 
after obtaining consent accords with duty and is permitted.  This 
notion is consistent with the treatment of consent in tort law.  
Consent generally bars recovery for interferences with person or 
property, not because it is an affirmative defense, but because it 
proves that the tort never occurred.  Consent is a negative element of 
the tort.  Prosser and Keeton wrote that it is a “fundamental principle 
of the common law that volenti non fit injuria—to one who is willing, 
no wrong is done.”146   
Modern formulations of fiduciary duties reflect that consent is a 
negative element of a breach.  The Second Restatement of Trusts 
provides that the trustee is “under a duty not to profit at the expense 
of the other and not to enter into competition with him without his 
consent.”147  The Third Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers 
says that a lawyer may not represent two clients whose interests may 
conflict unless the clients consent.148  The point is not that the duty of 
loyalty requires the fiduciary to comply with rigid rules, but rather 
that the flexibility the fiduciary enjoys through consent is contained 
                                                          
an afterthought required by our groping around among cases as they arise, and not 
by any principle.  Otherwise the conditions would have had to be introduced into the 
formula of the prohibition, and in this way it would itself have become a permissive 
law.”  Id.  See also GREGOR, supra note 142, at 101 (restating Kant’s preference for 
permissive laws over exceptions). 
 146. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 112 (5th 
ed. 1992); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. a (1977) (asserting that 
one does not suffer a legal wrong as the result of an act to which, unaffected by 
fraud, mistake or duress, he freely or apparently consents). 
 147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (1957).  The ABA’s rule on 
confidentiality states, “A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent . . . .”  MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2000).  When the ABA amended the Model 
Rule recently to permit disclosure to prevent the client from committing certain 
crimes or frauds or to address injuries that result, the ABA included a requirement 
that client used the lawyer’s services to further the crime or fraud.  As a result, the 
ABA was able to argue that such use constitutes an abuse of the attorney-client 
relationship so that the client “forfeits the protection of this Rule.”  This is not the 
same as providing for an exception, rather, the rule is no longer relevant because the 
client has acted to purge its applicability.  See ABA, Task Force on Corporate 
Responsibility, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 7.  See also Frankel, supra 
note 1, at 1232 (recognizing that the lack of an owner’s consent is an element of the 
wrong associated with a fiduciary’s misappropriation of entrusted property and 
power). 
 148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 128 (2000). 
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in the rules governing the fiduciary’s conduct and may not be 
presented after the fact as a justification for breach. 
These two aspects of the duty of loyalty—that the duty is negative 
and unambiguous—and the discussion of the duty of loyalty as a 
perfect duty, help explain what is meant by the duty of loyalty in the 
fiduciary context.  They also help to contrast the duty of loyalty with 
the duty of care. 
B. The Duty of Care 
The duty of loyalty to refrain from harming the principal 
represents only the first aspect of the fiduciary duty.  A fiduciary at 
common law also must act with strict obeisance to the duty of care.  
Pomeroy articulated the division between the duty of loyalty and the 
duty of care with respect to trustees: 
The second branch of the trustee’s obligation is to use care and 
diligence in the discharge of his functions.  This duty is very 
comprehensive; it extends through the entire range of his conduct; 
it is entirely independent of the question of good faith, for he will 
be liable for its failure even when no wrongful intent nor violation 
of good faith is charged upon him.149 
                                                          
 149. POMEROY, supra note 104, at § 1066. 
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1. The nature of the duty of care 
a. Positive duties 
The duty of care is a positive duty.150  It arises from control or 
discretion that the fiduciary exercises over the principal’s affairs.  
Control gives the fiduciary the means to take steps to act for the 
principal’s benefit and is necessary to engage in the very conduct that 
the parties agreed the fiduciary will perform.151  In fact, one may think 
of the duty of care in the first instance as a duty to maintain control.152  
When company directors, for example, support the transfer of 
corporate control, they are held to a heightened level of care.153  And 
                                                          
 150. One may draw lessons about the two branches of fiduciary duties from 
comparative law.  German law also distinguishes between negative and positive duties 
in this area.  Section 266 of the German Criminal Code, entitled Breach of Trust, 
covers much of the conduct governed by fiduciary law in common law systems.  
Section 266(1) of the code contains two requirements.  The first is a prohibition 
against abuse of power.  The second is a requirement to safeguard property interests of 
another.  The German text reflects the negative and positive aspects of the duty.  The 
first is a prohibition against Mißbrauch, meaning abuse, misuse, or improper use.  
The second is a requirement of Wahrnehmen, meaning to preserve, safeguard, or 
protect.  See, e.g., AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES:  THE GERMAN PENAL 
CODE 159 (Stephen Thaman trans., 2002) (translating § 266 StGB, a portion of the 
German penal code). 
Section 266 is used to prosecute what Anglo-American lawyers call breach of 
fiduciary duty, although Germans refer to it as breach of trust.  The prosecution of 
Deutsche Bank CEO and Mannesmann board member, Josef Ackerman, for 
example, for awarding excessive bonus compensation to Mannesmann executives 
allegedly to convince them to refrain from opposing a Mannesmann takeover by 
Vodafone, was brought under section 266 and described by Anglo-American sources 
as a breach of fiduciary duty case.  See Landgericht Düsseldorf, Mitteilung der 
Pressestelle, Hauptverfahren im “Mannesmann-Verfahren” eröffnet [Press Release:  Trial 
begins in the Mannesmann case] (2004), available at http://www.lg-duesseldorf.n-
rw.de/presse/dokument/04-01.pdf. 
 151. Many courts recognize that a fiduciary has significant power over the 
principal.  See, e.g., Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 348 
(4th Cir. 1998) (noting that a fiduciary relationship arises when one party 
“figuratively holds all the cards—all the financial or technical information, for 
example”); United States Nat’l Bank of Portland v. Guiss, 331 P.2d 865, 876 (Or. 
1958) (commenting that a fiduciary relationship often gives one party the power and 
means “to take undue advantage of, or exercise undue influence over, the other” 
(quoting 23 AM. JUR. Fraud and Deceit § 14 (2004)); Pomroy v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 
750 A.2d 395, 399 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (stating that a fiduciary relationship 
clearly arises when one is legally vested with the power to control funds owned by an 
incompetent). 
 152. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 175 (1959) (explaining that the 
trustee’s duty of care includes taking reasonable steps to acquire and maintain 
control of trust property); POMEROY, supra note 104, at §§ 1068-1069 (defining the 
duty of care and diligence as the duty to maintain control over the trust property and 
not to delegate authority or surrender control, and further noting that, if a co-trustee 
exists, one trustee cannot surrender control of trust property and performance of 
trust duties to the co-trustee). 
 153. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 
(Del. 1993) (holding that a director’s conduct is subject to enhanced scrutiny in two 
instances:  (1) the approval of a sale of corporate control, and (2) the adoption of 
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recently, the surrender of control by board members to one 
individual has been blamed in part for failures in corporate 
governance.154 
Cases in the area of directors’ liability distinguish between negative 
duties under the duty of loyalty and positive duties under the duty of 
care.  The leading case of Smith v. Van Gorkom155 is illustrative.  The 
plaintiffs challenged a decision by Trans Union Corporation’s board 
of directors to approve a merger with another company.156  The 
Delaware Court of Chancery, after trial, granted judgment for the 
directors, and the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed.157  The court 
stated that “fulfillment of the fiduciary function requires more than 
the mere absence of bad faith or fraud . . . [and imposes] an 
affirmative duty to protect those interests and to proceed with a 
critical eye in assessing information.”158  Similarly, in Paramount 
Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.,159 the Delaware Supreme 
Court invalidated a merger agreement between Paramount and 
Viacom, which discouraged competing bids.  In determining that the 
Paramount directors violated their fiduciary duties, the court recited 
a list of matters that the directors should have considered, including 
whether either offer could have been improved, whether the parties 
could actually complete the deal, alternative courses of action, timing 
constraints, and other available information.160   
Other cases refer to a duty of directors to inform themselves of all 
material information reasonably available before making a decision;161 
an “active duty” to learn about the affairs of a corporation and what 
                                                          
defensive measures in response to a threat to corporate control).  The Delaware 
Supreme Court noted that these events have a significant impact on stockholders 
and that they represent a fundamental (and perhaps irrevocable) change in the 
nature of the corporate enterprise.  Id. at 47-48; see also Brudney, supra note 2, at 262 
(recognizing that efforts by corporate insiders to preserve or alter control 
arrangements for their own benefit may diminish the value of the stockholder’s vote 
and, as a result, bring into play the insider’s fiduciary role). 
 154. See, e.g., DENNIS R. BERESFORD ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL 
INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WORLDCOM, INC. 30 (Mar. 
31, 2003) (noting that the Board of Directors’ failure in corporate oversight resulted, 
in part, from that fact that they had surrendered leadership to CEO Bernard Ebbers 
and, in some cases, viewed their roles as diminished), at http://news.findlaw.com 
/hdocs/docs/worldcom/bdspcomm60903rpt.pdf (on file with the American 
University Law Review). 
 155. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 156. Id. at 863. 
 157. Id. at 864. 
 158. Id. at 872. 
 159. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993). 
 160. Id. at 49. 
 161. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
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could be done to improve them;162 and, in the case of a contest for 
corporate control, a duty to encourage the highest possible price, or 
canvas the market to determine if higher bids may be elicited.163  An 
allegation that a director has not taken steps to actively monitor some 
aspect of the company’s affairs is an allegation of a breach of the duty 
of care, not the duty of loyalty.164 
The Corporate Director’s Guidebook states that, in addition to the 
duty of loyalty, “the corporate director also assumes a duty to act 
carefully in fulfilling the important tasks of monitoring and directing 
the activities of corporate management.”165  The Guidebook expresses 
the director’s duty of care as a series of positive undertakings, a “duty 
of attention” characterized as “a responsibility to participate actively 
in the oversight of the enterprise’s activities.”166  Such participation 
includes attending meetings, reviewing adequate information, 
reviewing documentation, and monitoring delegated activities.167  
Finally, while the doctrine of the duty of care is largely judge-made 
law, when assimilating fiduciary language into statutory text, Congress 
has distinguished between positive and negative duties as well.168 
The fiduciary duty for lawyers embodies similar themes about the 
nature of the duty of care.  The American Bar Association notes, “At 
the core of the duty of diligence is a lawyer’s obligation to actually 
perform the work for which she was hired.”169  Under the rubric of 
duties of competence and diligence, the Third Restatement of the 
                                                          
 162. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). 
 163. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286-87 (Del. 1989). 
 164. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (articulating plaintiffs’ complaint as charging defendants with breaching their 
duty of care in operating the corporation because they failed to be active monitors of 
corporate affairs); see also BERESFORD ET AL., supra note 154, at 31 (attributing 
WorldCom’s failures in corporate governance, in part, to the Board of Director’s 
detachment from corporate affairs). 
 165. ABA COMM. ON CORPORATE LAWS, CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK, 
reprinted in 33 BUS. LAW. 1591, 1600 (1978). 
 166. Id., reprinted in 33 BUS. LAW. at 1602. 
 167. Id.; cf. WILLIAM POWERS ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL 
INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. (Feb. 1, 2002) 
(finding that the Enron Board of Directors failed in its duty to monitor certain 
transactions and to react to warning signs in those transactions), at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport (on file with the American 
University Law Review). 
 168. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 1382, at 37 (1970) (explaining that the application of 
section 36(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (2000), 
which governs the conduct of mutual fund directors, is not limited to “situations 
where an actual intent to violate the law [is] shown or to acts of affirmative 
misconduct,” and noting that “nonfeasance of duty or abdication of responsibility” 
may constitute a breach of fiduciary duty under the Act); S. REP. NO. 184, at 36 
(1969) (containing identical language to H.R. REP. NO. 1382, at 37 (1970)). 
 169. ABA/BNA LAWYER’S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 31:402 (1997). 
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Law Governing Lawyers requires that a lawyer’s knowledge and skills 
be used to perform the services required by the client’s objectives.170  
Under Standard of Care, the Restatement provides that such duties 
may include “inquiry into the facts, analysis of the law, exercise of 
professional judgment, communication with the client, rendering of 
practical and ethical advice, and drafting of documents.”171  The 
Supreme Court has contrasted the lawyer’s “duty of loyalty, a duty to 
avoid conflicts of interest” with the “overarching duty to advocate the 
defendant’s cause and the more particular duties to consult with the 
defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant 
informed of important developments in the course of the 
prosecution.”172  The same is true for trustees.  When the Second 
Restatement of Trusts describes the duty to administer a trust, it 
emphasizes the duty of care.173 
b. Open-ended duties 
The nature of the fiduciary’s duty of care, unlike the duty of 
loyalty, is positive, but it is also open-ended and uncertain.174  A 
frequent bromide is that the fiduciary has a duty of utmost care to 
treat the principal as if the principal were the fiduciary himself.175  
                                                          
 170. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52 cmt. c (1998). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
 173. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959) (stating that a trustee’s 
duty of care is to “exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would 
exercise in dealing with his own property”); see also id. at § 176 (explaining that a 
trustee must use appropriate care and skill to preserve trust property); id. at § 172 
(noting that the trustee is obligated to keep and render clear and accurate 
accounts); cf. Otto v. Niles, 106 F.3d 1456, 1462 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that 
requiring trustees to keep and render clear and accurate accounts reinforces the 
policies behind fiduciary law by ensuring that trustees perform their obligations 
faithfully and with care (citing RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 172 (1959)). 
 174. See Weinrib, supra note 2, at 7 (“The reason that agents, trustees, partners, 
and directors are subjected to the fiduciary obligation is that they have a leeway for 
the exercise of discretion in dealings with third parties which can affect the legal 
position of their principals.”); see also Clark, supra note 1, at 73 (stating that, with 
corporate managers, the open-ended nature of legally imposed duties is substantial, 
as they are empowered to manage corporate affairs but limited by the duty of care in 
exercising those powers).  Clark also states that the duty of loyalty is open-ended; but 
here he refers to the application of the duty to potentially new fiduciary 
relationships, not to the nature of the duty of loyalty.  Id. at 219 n.31. 
 175. See, e.g., SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) 
(stating that courts have imposed an affirmative duty on fiduciaries of “utmost good 
faith”); Lawton v. Nyman, 327 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that a fiduciary 
relationship imposes upon the fiduciary the duty to act with utmost good faith); 
Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (explaining that a 
fiduciary must treat his principal with the utmost care, loyalty, and good faith, as the 
fiduciary would treat himself); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 64 P.3d 953, 957 (Idaho 2003) 
(concluding that corporate directors must act with the utmost good faith in 
managing a corporation); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against McKean, 64 P.3d 
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The courts, however, do not explain what they mean by utmost care 
and in some cases seem to be promoting a supererogatory norm.176  
The word “utmost” suggests the most extreme or outer limit.  In most 
duty of care cases, however, the most extreme or outer limit cannot 
be defined, and therefore, cannot be achieved.  In this sense, one 
could describe the demands placed on a fiduciary under the rubric of 
the duty of care as aspirational.  Professors James Henderson and 
Richard Pearson wrote an article in the 1970s about the limits of 
aspirational commands in enforcing federal environmental policies.177  
The objective of many tasks, they explained, are subject to resource 
limitations.178  “[T]he phrase ‘as best he can’ does not require a 
single-minded, ‘drop everything else’ approach to performing the 
task.  Instead, aspiration requires that, within these limitations, an 
actor will perform to the best of his ability.”179 
Fiduciaries frequently carry out their responsibilities under the 
yoke of such limitations.  Consider the example of a trustee 
managing trust assets.  A diligent trustee could spend a majority of his 
time determining how to invest.  Is the trustee obligated to spend 
eight hours each day doing so?  Why not spend sixteen hours each 
day, only taking time to sleep and eat?  The same is true for attorneys.  
Courts have stated that an attorney has a duty to be a zealous 
advocate180 and defend a client’s case to the utmost.181  Many complex 
                                                          
1226, 1233 (Wash. 2003) (recognizing that MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.14 
requires an attorney to handle his client’s property with the “utmost care, 
transparency, and prudence”). 
 176. See, e.g., Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.) 
(concluding that a trustee is held to  “something stricter than the morals of the 
marketplace” and explaining that “not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor 
the most sensitive, is . . . the standard of behavior”); see also Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. 
of Pittsburgh v. Cagle, 68 F.3d 905, 912 (5th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging that the 
fiduciary obligation may impose an affirmative duty to disclose facts beyond that 
required by contract); McConaghy v. Sequa Corp., 294 F. Supp. 2d 151, 164 (D.R.I. 
2003) (agreeing with the plaintiff’s argument that the defendants, as fiduciaries, had 
heightened duties of loyalty and care greater than those owed by an ordinary 
tortfeasor). 
 177. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Richard N. Pearson, Implementing Federal 
Environmental Policies:  The Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1429 
(1978). 
 178. Id. at 1430. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 271 F.3d 835, 842 (9th Cir. 
2001) (acknowledging that an attorney must represent his client zealously and 
protect his client’s legal rights); United States v. Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299, 1308 (5th Cir. 
1994) (noting that one of the basic tenets of the adversarial legal system is that an 
attorney owes his client zealous representation, including the advocacy of those 
positions which have an arguable basis despite contrary authority); Sanders v. Ratelle, 
21 F.3d 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) (asserting that an attorney must zealously represent his 
client and finding that an attorney who refused to listen to key information 
regarding his client’s most important defense failed to provide such representation); 
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matters, however, could benefit from nearly infinite preparation.  It is 
a rare case when an attorney would do nothing more to prepare if 
given additional time.  The press of other work and matters outside 
the office, however, generally will not allow most attorneys to spend 
eight hours each day, let alone sixteen, preparing a single matter.182  
A leading case propounding the duty of mutual fund trustees states 
that whether trustees are “fully informed about all facts” bearing on 
certain matters related to the fund is important to determine whether 
the trustees have breached their fiduciary duties.183  But complete 
knowledge on any matter is unattainable.  Sissela Bok makes a similar 
point about a promise to tell the whole truth.184  The whole truth on 
any particular topic, she wrote, is probably unknowable, and if it were 
knowable, it would require weeks or months of explanation.185 
Courts recognize that it is simply not possible for a fiduciary to be 
aware of every piece of relevant information before making a 
decision on behalf of the principal, and a fiduciary cannot guarantee 
that a correct judgment will be made.186  In approving a settlement of 
a derivative action in In re Caremark International Inc.,187 the Delaware 
Chancery Court examined the director’s duty to monitor the affairs 
of the corporation and stated that the director’s duty to be informed 
does not require directors to have detailed knowledge about all 
aspects of the corporation.188  This responsibility would be 
“inconsistent with the scale and scope of efficient organization size in 
this technological age.”189  In Barnes v. Andrews,190 the court examined 
                                                          
Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Pullman, Comley, Bradley & Reeves, 929 F.2d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 
1991) (stating that an attorney has a duty of “robust representation” of his client’s 
interests). 
 181. See Lipsett v. Blanco, 975 F.2d 934, 941 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating that an 
attorney has a duty to pursue or defend his client’s case to the utmost and describing 
that duty as taking steps to resolve litigation on terms that are most favorable to the 
client). 
 182. Cf. id. (pointing out that pursuing or defending a case to the utmost may 
contradict the overarching duty to resolve a legal matter on terms that are most 
favorable to the client). 
 183. Gartenburg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 930 (2d Cir. 
1982). 
 184. SISSELA BOK, LYING:  MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 4 (1999). 
 185. Id.  Cooter and Freedman made a similar point in economic terms.  See 
Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship:  Its Economic 
Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1057-59 (1991) (arguing that 
a fiduciary would be acting unreasonably if the marginal cost of her effort exceeded 
the resultant marginal benefit to the principal). 
 186. See infra notes 187, 190. 
 187. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 188. Id. at 971. 
 189. Id.  Recent research in the cognitive sciences confirms the futility of 
requiring senior executives to possess large amounts of data and detailed 
information when making business decisions.  Kathleen M. Sutcliffe & Klaus Weber, 
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whether a director failed in his duty to pay adequate attention to the 
affairs of a corporation and should be liable for the collapse of the 
enterprise.  In his opinion, Learned Hand explained, “The measure 
of a director’s duties in this regard is uncertain; the courts contenting 
themselves with vague declarations, such as that a director must give 
reasonable attention to the corporate business.”191 
Attorney rules of conduct also recognize limitations on the 
attorney’s ability to gather, analyze, and act on information.  The 
Rules of Professional Conduct state that a lawyer should represent a 
client zealously, but they add that an attorney is not required to press 
for every possible advantage that may be available for a client.192  The 
Supreme Court, in Strickland v. Washington,193 stated that no set of 
detailed rules regarding an attorney’s conduct can possibly take into 
account the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel.194  
Moreover, no two lawyers would represent a client in exactly the same 
way.195  Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Strickland stated 
that counsel must be afforded “wide latitude” in performing his 
duties.196  Likewise, no one expects the decisions of a fiduciary to be 
perfect.  The Delaware Supreme Court stated its task was not to 
decide “whether the directors made a perfect decision” but whether it 
was within a range of reasonableness.197 
                                                          
The High Cost of Accurate Knowledge, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2003, at 74 (questioning the 
traditional assumption that additional investments in obtaining information improve 
accuracy in decision-making and help companies adapt to a changing environment). 
 190. 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). 
 191. Id. at 615; see also Henderson, Jr. & Pearson, supra note 177, at 1435-38 
(reflecting on the vagueness inherent in aspirational commands). 
 192. D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 & cmt. 1 (2004).  Not only is the lawyer 
not required to press for every advantage, a lawyer may lose most of his cases and still 
be practicing consistently with his duty of care.  Under the adversarial system, most 
attorneys cannot win every case, and no one would suggest that a lawyer has 
breached his duty because he failed to do so.  Malpractice cases recognize that an 
attorney “is not a guarantor of the results,” Helmbrecht v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 362 N.W.2d 
118, 130 (Wis. 1985), and the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS provides 
that the duty of competence, like the duty of diligence, “does not make the lawyer a 
guarantor of a successful outcome in the representation.”  RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52 cmt. b, at 376 (2004) (citation omitted).  In fact, in 
performing his fiduciary duty, the lawyer may not only lose a particular case, but he 
may generally perform well below average.  Otherwise, half of the profession would 
regularly be guilty of malpractice.  Id. 
 193. 466 U.S. 668 (1983). 
 194. Id. at 688-89. 
 195. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE:  BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE 
LAW ON TRIAL 8 (1988) (discussing Bernhard Goetz’s decision to replace his court 
appointed attorney with an attorney who favored a different defense as an example 
of how clients may choose among attorneys who display different styles, strengths, 
and weaknesses). 
 196. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 709 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 197. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 931 (Del. 2003). 
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This discussion reveals that one must evaluate the duty of care, 
unlike the duty of loyalty, by the process the fiduciary undertakes in 
performing his functions and not the outcome achieved.  The very 
word “care” connotes a process.  One associates caring with a 
condition, state of mind, manner of mental attention, a feeling, 
regard, or liking for something.198  How else may one determine 
whether a financial adviser who regularly achieves below average 
returns, or an attorney who loses most cases, has performed his duty 
of care?  It is only through evaluating the steps the fiduciary took 
while doing his job, and not whether they resulted in success, that 
one may judge whether the fiduciary has breached his duty. 
The emphasis on process in duty of care cases is embodied in the 
business judgment rule in corporate law.199  Judges in common law 
courts of general jurisdiction cannot possibly second-guess every 
decision made by a board of directors, and a court’s function is not to 
resolve questions of policy, resources, and judgment for the board.  
Thus, while a director’s fiduciary duty entails positive actions to 
benefit the corporation and its shareholders, courts presume that, 
absent fraud, self-dealing or other instances of bad faith (a breach of 
the duty of loyalty), a director makes good faith decisions.200  It is 
                                                          
 198. See THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 893-94 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner 
eds., 2d ed. 1989). 
 199. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (explaining that liability for a breach of duty does not arise because the judge 
or jury thought that a director made an incorrect decision, but rather, the court must 
determine whether the director’s process in reaching the decision was rational or 
made in good faith to advance corporate interests). 
 200. See generally DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE:  FIDUCIARY 
DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS (5th ed. 1998) (arguing that the business judgment 
rule creates a presumption that directors acted with due care).  Illustrations of the 
business judgment rule arise in all aspects of American business life.  Courts must 
defer to directors’ judgment lest they be forced to make decisions on matters 
ranging from employment agreements, In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 
A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998), to conflicting claims among security holders, Harbor Fin. 
Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879 (Del. Ch. 1999), and to depleting corporate 
assets, Rosenfield v. Metals Selling Corp., 643 A.2d 1253 (Conn. 1994). 
That courts may not agree with the judgment of directors is evident from case law.  
An interesting example is Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. Ct. App. 1968).  
Stockholders of the Chicago National League Ball Club, owner of the Chicago Cubs, 
brought a derivative action against Philip Wrigley and other directors of the 
company for failing to install lights at Wrigley Field and schedule night games.  Id. at 
777.  The plaintiffs argued that since night baseball was first played in 1935, nineteen 
of the then twenty major league teams had scheduled night games.  Id.  If the 
directors of the Chicago ball club continued to be obstinate, the Cubs would face 
another season of operating losses.  Id.  They argued that Philip Wrigley, who owned 
eighty percent of the company, refused to install lights not because of the 
shareholders’ interest but because of his personal view that baseball is a daytime 
sport.  Id. at 777-78.  The court, however, would not ascribe improper motives to 
Wrigley.  Id. at 780.  It searched instead for what may have been an appropriate 
rationale for Wrigley’s actions, such as preserving the surrounding neighborhood, 
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precisely in the decision-making process that the duty of care arises, 
and the courts recognize that “a director’s duty to exercise an 
informed business judgment is in the nature of a duty of care, as 
distinguished from a duty of loyalty.”201  Recent attempts to buttress 
the duty of care for company directors through administrative 
rulemaking highlight the emphasis on process in doing the director’s 
job.202 
The duty of care for other fiduciaries is similarly process-
determinative.  In deciding whether a conviction must be set aside for 
ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court stated that a “fair 
assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be 
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct 
the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate 
the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”203  Cases 
examining a trustee’s duty of care make the same point.  In a New 
York case where beneficiaries alleged that a trustee should have been 
                                                          
and then deferred to Wrigley’s judgment, despite that it may have disagreed:  “By 
these thoughts we do not mean to say that we have decided that the decision of the 
directors was a correct one.  That is beyond our jurisdiction and ability.  We are 
merely saying that the decision is one properly before directors.”  Id.  
 201. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985); see In re Caremark 
Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d at 967-68 (remarking on the process-oriented 
nature of the business judgment rule that is based on a respect for all good faith 
board decisions). 
 202. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Rule 10A-3(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-
3(b)(2) (2004) (stating, “The audit committee of each listed issuer, in its capacity as 
a committee of the board of directors, must be directly responsible for the 
appointment, compensation, retention and oversight of the work of any registered 
public accounting firm engaged . . . for the purpose of preparing or issuing an audit 
report.”). 
In adopting the rules, the SEC stated that it was not establishing specific rules 
governing the audit committee, rather, that “specific decisions regarding the 
execution of the audit committee’s oversight responsibilities, as well as decisions 
regarding the extent of desired involvement by the audit committee, are best left to 
the discretion of the audit committee of the individual issuer in assessing the issuer’s 
individual circumstances.”  Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 
Securities Act Release No. 8220, 68 Fed. Reg. 18788, 18796 (Apr. 16, 2003). 
 203. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1983).  In this case, the trial 
judge, due to aggravating circumstances, sentenced the respondent to death.  
Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 658, 663-64 (Fla. 1978).  The respondent alleged he 
was denied effective assistance of counsel and outlined specific actions that he 
believed his attorney should have taken, such as moving for a continuance to prepare 
for sentencing, requesting a psychiatric report, investigating and presenting 
character witnesses, seeking a pre-sentence investigation report, presenting 
meaningful arguments, and investigating the medical examiner’s reports or cross-
examining the experts.  Id. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, all 
federal and most state courts had adopted the “reasonably effective assistance” 
standard in assessing attorney performance, but the Supreme Court had not yet 
addressed the proper standard.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 683-84.  In doing so, the Court 
emphasized process over outcome and said it is “all too easy” for a court to conclude 
after the fact that a particular act or omission was unreasonable and, as such, the 
Court refused to do so.  Id. at 689, 698. 
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prescient enough to sell shares of a utility company before the onset 
of the Great Depression, the court expressed that the trustee’s 
conduct must be viewed from the perspective of the trustee’s actions 
at the time the actions occurred: 
[T]he trustee’s conduct is not to be judged from the vantage point 
of hindsight; instead, it must be considered prospectively—the 
flashback method must be employed, unaided or enlightened by 
subsequent events.  To decide in the tranquil afterwards what the 
trustee should have done during the period of irresolution, is not 
easy.  Yet that is the unenviable task the Court is called upon to 
perform.204 
The Second Restatement of Trusts similarly provides, “Whether the 
trustee is prudent in the doing of an act depends upon the 
circumstances as they reasonably appear to him at the time when he 
does the act and not at some subsequent time when his conduct is 
called in question.”205  One may certainly find exceptions where 
courts look to the outcome of an action, and not the process followed 
with respect to that action, to determine whether a fiduciary 
breached the duty of care.  Those exceptions, however, typically arise 
in special circumstances or as the result of a particular statutory 
scheme that warrant a departure from the common law rule.206 
                                                          
 204. In re Pate’s Estate, 84 N.Y.S.2d 853, 858 (Sur. Ct. 1948) (citations omitted). 
 205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 cmt. b (2004). 
 206. See, e.g., Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 
1982).  Gartenberg analyzed standards courts should apply when determining whether 
fees paid by a mutual fund to an adviser to manage the fund are excessive under 
Section 36 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-35(b) (1987).  
In that case, mutual fund shareholders brought a derivative action against the fund, 
the fund’s investment adviser, and other affiliates of the fund, alleging that the fee 
the fund agreed to pay its adviser was so high that it constituted a breach of fiduciary 
duty under the Act.  Id. at 926-27.  The court adopted, at least in part, an outcome-
oriented approach, stating that for a violation to occur, the adviser must charge a fee 
“so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relation to the services 
rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.”  Id. at 
928.  The court also stepped away from the lower court’s ruling, which, in deciding 
whether the adviser violated its fiduciary duty, “gave weight to the process” by which 
the disinterested trustees of the fund approved the management agreement.  Id. at 
927.  The court of appeals stated that even if the trustees were fully informed of all 
facts bearing on the adviser’s fee and performed their duties conscientiously—even if 
the process were sound—if the result was a disproportionately large advisory fee, that 
alone could give rise to a breach of duty by both the trustees and the investment 
adviser.  Id. at 930.  The appeals court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove 
that the fees charged were so excessive or unfair as to amount to a breach of duty 
and pointed out that fund investors, while not realizing the highest possible return 
on their investment, enjoyed a better-than-average return.  Id. 
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2. The duty of care as an imperfect duty 
The previous discussion illuminates the nature of the duty of care 
as ambiguous and process-oriented.  It contrasts with the duty of 
loyalty, which requires negative conduct and is generally not 
ambiguous.  Drawing on Kant, one may call the duty of loyalty a 
perfect duty.  The fiduciary’s duty of care, by contrast, requires 
affirmative conduct to act in the principal’s interest with respect to 
the assets or affairs of the principal entrusted to the fiduciary.  The 
fiduciary relationship, as discussed, arises when the fiduciary agrees 
to act for the benefit of the principal.  The Third Restatement of 
Trusts provides, “Despite the differences in the legal circumstances 
and responsibilities of various fiduciaries, one characteristic is 
common to all:  a person in a fiduciary relationship to another is 
under a duty to act for the benefit of the other as to matters within 
the scope of the relationship.”207  The fiduciary, therefore, has agreed 
to make the interest of the principal his purpose or his end.  The 
duty to take affirmative steps to further the interests of another is 
similar to what Kant described as an imperfect duty,208 and the 
fiduciary’s duty of care is one illustration of Kant’s imperfect duty. 
Kant’s example of an imperfect duty to others is the duty to 
contribute to their welfare or assistance.209  The duty is positive; it 
requires particular acts to be taken for their benefit.  Kant asks what 
is wrong with simply not injuring others—why does one have to take 
positive steps to assist them?210  He answers his question by explaining 
that it is not possible to desire this way of thinking to be universal.211  
If it were universal, while society could continue to exist, and perhaps 
be better off than a society fraught with cheating and betrayal, it is 
not possible to wish for this state of affairs to be universal.  Instances 
inevitably would arise where we each would desire the assistance of 
others and we will have robbed ourselves of that opportunity.212  
                                                          
 207. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (2003); see RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 cmt. a (1958) (defining a fiduciary as one who acts 
primarily for the benefit of the principal); see also Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary 
Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539, 540 (1949) (defining a fiduciary as a person who acts in 
the interest of another). 
 208. KANT, supra note 134, at 430 (characterizing the decision to help others as a 
positive action towards harmonization with humanity, as opposed to merely 
refraining from harming others, which is negative action). 
 209. Id. 
 210. See id. at 423 (“‘What concern of mine is it?  Let each one be happy as heaven 
wills, or as he can make himself; I will not take anything from him or even envy him; 
but to his welfare or to his assistance in time of need I have no desire to 
contribute.’”) (citations omitted). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
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While perfect duties are generally negative, imperfect duties are 
generally positive.  When discussing the duty to contribute to the 
welfare of others, Kant wrote: 
Humanity might indeed exist if no one contributed to the 
happiness of others, provided he did not intentionally detract from 
it, but this harmony with humanity as an end in itself is only 
negative, not positive, if everyone does not also endeavor, as far as 
he can, to further the purposes of others.213 
Kant analyzed the open-ended nature of imperfect duties in his 
Metaphysics of Morals.214  While one has a duty to promote the welfare 
of others, he wrote, “it is impossible to assign specific limits to the 
extent of this sacrifice.”215  In determining such limits, decisions have 
to be made on a case-by-case basis.  The duty to promote the welfare 
of others “depends, in large part, on what each person’s true needs 
are in view of his sensibilities, and it must be left to each to decide 
this for himself.”216  Kant recognized that the goal of promoting the 
happiness of others at the sacrifice of one’s own happiness presents 
an internal contradiction.  “Hence” he says, “this duty is only a wide 
one; the duty has in it a latitude for doing more or less, and no 
specific limits can be assigned to what should be done.”217 
An open-ended duty without specific limits describes the fiduciary 
duty of care.  The doctrine of the duty of care leaves leeway between 
the objective of promoting the well-being of the principal and the 
actions one must take in furtherance of that objective.  One cannot 
draw up a checklist of actions to fulfill the duty.  Rather, the duty lies 
in making the end of the principal the fiduciary’s purpose, and it is 
largely left to the fiduciary to make proper judgments and act 
accordingly.  Mary Gregor has explained that imperfect duties consist 
in the adoption of ends, not in determinate actions.218  They leave 
latitude between our aims, or our ends, and in the actions required 
for the realization of these aims.  It is in this latitude where judgment 
determines action not specified by law.219 
Under this analysis, one faces a puzzle with respect to the 
implications for fiduciary doctrine.  If the actions required to fulfill 
imperfect duties are not specified by law, then taking such actions 
                                                          
 213. Id. at 430. 
 214. KANT, supra note 141, at 390-93. 
 215. Id. at 393. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id.  In describing the duty, Kant uses the German word, Spielraum, literally 
“playroom,” which perhaps better captures its essence than the English word 
“latitude.” 
 218. GREGOR, supra note 142, at 96. 
 219. Id. 
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arguably is not a legal duty.220  While imperfect duties generally are 
not legal duties, the fiduciary duty of care, of course, is a legal duty.  
How can this be?  As discussed, law cannot stipulate when one has 
fulfilled imperfect duties because they are open-ended.  No one can 
say with certainty whether the fiduciary must spend four, eight, or 
twelve hours a day promoting the ends of the principal.  But the 
prophylactic rules discussed above, which ensure that the fiduciary 
not act against the interests of the principal, also ensure that when 
the principal does act, the acts are done, not out of self-interest, but 
to promote the ends of the principal.221  By forcing the fiduciary to 
refrain from transacting with the principal, for example, the fiduciary 
is forced to refrain from acting out of self-interest.  Garden-variety 
transactions between the fiduciary and his principal, therefore, are 
prohibited.  These prophylactic rules ensure that when the fiduciary 
acts, he acts to promote the ends of his principal and not his own 
ends.222 
The old Supreme Court cases discussed above capture the point.  
In Michoud v. Girod,223 the Court held that the prophylactic rule—the 
disability to purchase—“imposes” the duty on a fiduciary to protect 
the interests of the principal.224  How is it that a negative duty imposes 
a duty to protect?  The Court’s concern was that the principal’s “own 
personal interest may withdraw him” from the faithful discharge of 
his duty.225  The prophylactic rule “prohibits a party from purchasing 
on his own account that which his duty or trust requires him to sell 
on account of another, and from purchasing on account of another 
that which he sells on his own account.”226  Thus, when the fiduciary is 
required to sell or purchase for the account of the principal, if the 
fiduciary cannot transact with the principal for the fiduciary’s own 
                                                          
 220. See KANT, supra note 141, at 390 (arguing that the law’s inability to clearly 
specify which actions one must take to fulfill imperfect duties creates room for the 
exercise of free choice in compliance with those duties). 
 221. Some have referred to this as the exclusive benefit principle.  See Brudney, 
supra note 1, at 599 n.9, 603 (explaining that the duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary 
to act solely for the beneficiary’s benefit and that the fiduciary may have to forgo 
additional benefits, even if they come at no cost to the beneficiary); see also 
Flannigan, supra note 2, at 296 (stating that “the strictness of the fiduciary obligation 
is calculated to ensure not simply the diversion or non-maintenance of value but to 
promote the singular attentiveness of the fiduciary to the interests of the trusting 
party.”) (citation omitted). 
 222. See Brudney, supra note 1, at 624 (contrasting the exclusive benefit rule 
governing fiduciary relations to classic contractual arrangements where each party 
acts to benefit himself). 
 223. 45 U.S. 503 (1846). 
 224. Id. at 555. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
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benefit, then the fiduciary must be acting for the benefit of the 
principal.227  Similarly, in Magruder v. Drury,228 the Court held that the 
rule that a trustee cannot profit from his trust “springs from his duty 
to protect the interests of the estate.”229  The intention, the Court 
said, is to remove any self-interest “which can interfere with the 
faithful discharge” of the fiduciary duty.230 
The duty of care, therefore, is akin to a legally enforceable 
imperfect duty.231  Enforceability, however, is often difficult in duty of 
care cases.232  It is left to the courts to determine after the fact 
whether the fiduciary has acted (or failed to act) in breach of the 
duty in a given case.  Courts typically have applied the doctrine of 
negligence to establish when an action (or inaction) of a fiduciary 
results in breach.233  In the well-known formulation of the prudent 
man rule, Justice Putnam of the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts in Harvard College v. Amory234 held that a trustee is 
required only to “observe how men of prudence, discretion and 
intelligence manage their own affairs.”235  This passage has given rise 
                                                          
 227. One may respond that the fiduciary could be acting for the benefit of a third 
person—not the principal.  But if the fiduciary acts to benefit a third person, the 
fiduciary presumably has an interest in benefiting the third person.  The third 
person’s benefit, therefore, is tantamount to a benefit to the fiduciary, and acting in 
the third person’s benefit is therefore prohibited just as acting in self-interest is 
prohibited.  Moreover, if the fiduciary acts to benefit a third person at the expense of 
the principal, such conduct would be harmful conduct toward the principal and 
prohibited by the duty of loyalty. 
 228. 235 U.S. 106 (1914). 
 229. Id. at 119. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Deborah DeMott has noted that judicial opinions in the fiduciary area are 
unique in their use of moral language to justify their outcomes.  She ascribes this to 
the situation specific quality of the obligation as well as the stringency of the 
standards for assessing a fiduciary’s behavior and the high value placed on trust.  
DeMott, supra note 1, at 891-92.  It may also be the case that judges use the 
sermonizing language to which DeMott refers because they recognize, at the deepest 
levels, that they are requiring the fiduciary by law to perform imperfect duties, which 
typically are not specified by law. 
 232. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (outlining the standards to prove a claim for breaching a duty of care); cf. 
Henderson, Jr. & Pearson, supra note 177, at 1434-35 (identifying nonverifiability and 
vagueness as problems in enforcing aspirational commands). 
 233. See Brudney, supra note 1, at 623 n.74 (stating, “Insofar as the fiduciary duty 
mandate embodies the duty of care, it may also be an objectionable example of state 
intrusion; but it does not impose a heavy obligation because it requires only the 
minimum acceptable level of performance rather than the maximum possible 
level.”). 
 234. 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830). 
 235. Id. at 461.  In this case, a testator left $50,000 to be invested by two trustees 
who also were executors of his estate.  The executors invested the money in shares of 
stock and incurred losses.  The appellants argued that the executors should have 
loaned the money for interest rather than investing in stock, which is relatively risky.  
Id. at 459-60.  In his opinion, Justice Putman stated that the executors were to invest 
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to countless variations of a reasonableness standard that applies 
broadly to fiduciary relations.  The Second Restatement of Trusts 
provides that the trustee must “exercise such care and skill as a man 
of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own 
property.”236  One formulation of the standard of care for attorneys is 
that they must “exercise the skill and knowledge ordinarily possessed 
by attorneys under similar circumstances.”237  Leading corporate law 
cases provide that directors must use “that amount of care which 
ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar 
circumstances.”238  While courts employ several different standards of 
negligence, in each case the individual’s conduct is compared to how 
a reasonable person would have acted when faced with the same 
situation.239 
This section has shown that the duty of loyalty and the duty of care 
differ in character.  The duty of loyalty is primarily negative, while the 
duty of care is positive.  The prohibitions required by the duty of 
                                                          
“according to their best judgment and discretion.”  Id. at 465. 
 236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (2004); see also POMEROY, supra note 
104, at § 1070 (stating, “The principle is well settled that trustees are bound to 
exercise care and prudence in the execution of their trust, in the same degree that 
men of common prudence ordinarily exercise in their own affairs.”).  See generally 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS:  PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE 227 (1992) (restating in 
one volume the rule governing the investment of trust assets and revising related 
rules concerning the conduct of a trustee). 
 237. 2 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 18.2, at 551 
(4th ed. 1996) (emphasis removed). 
 238. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).  But see In 
re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-68 n.16 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(stating that the negligence standard is inappropriate for directors because it 
encourages risk-averse behavior). 
 239. Duty of care cases distinguish between acting insufficiently, on the one hand, 
and not acting at all, on the other.  Courts view the two differently and employ 
different standards of negligence depending on which is before them.  See, e.g., In re 
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (permitting the business judgment rule defense for board 
decision resulting from poor decision-making but not for “unconsidered failure of 
the board to act”) (emphasis removed); Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., No. 
CIV. A. 7547, 1987 WL 28436, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1987) (contrasting the 
standard of liability of gross negligence for directors who undertake their 
responsibilities and the standard of ordinary negligence for directors who abdicate 
their responsibilities).  Similarly, Kant reminded us that one should not mistake the 
notion of imperfect duty in one area as a license to shirk responsibility in others.  
Rather, the notion of imperfect—or wide—duty is that it may be limited only by 
another duty owed to others or to ourselves.  Kant wrote, “But a wide duty is not to 
be taken as permission to make exceptions to the maxim of actions, but only as 
permission to limit one maxim of duty by another (e.g., love of one’s neighbor in 
general by love of one’s parents) . . . .”  KANT, supra note 141, at 390; see also id. at 
translator’s n. 35.  Kant distinguished between the failure to fulfill imperfect duties, 
on the one hand, and a transgression, or neglect of such duties, on the other.  The 
former, he wrote, represents only a “deficiency of moral worth,” the latter a “vice.”  
Id. at 390.  The difference between the failure to fulfill one’s duty of care and 
neglecting it entirely is reflected in corporate law cases analyzing directors’ duties of 
care. 
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loyalty are straightforward.  By contrast, the actions required by the 
duty of care are open-ended.  While the fiduciary’s purpose or end 
must be the benefit of the principal, the actions taken to fulfill that 
end cannot be prescribed.  While this discussion deepens one’s 
understanding of fiduciary duties generally, it is critical to understand 
how courts resolve difficult cases of conflicts of duty. 
III. RESOLVING CONFLICTS OF DUTY 
Distinguishing between the nature of the duty of loyalty and the 
duty of care accounts for how courts resolve the conflicts discussed in 
Part I.  Part II demonstrated that the duty of loyalty is generally 
negative and the duty of care is positive.  The duty of loyalty is 
absolute and the duty of care is incremental.  Thus, in cases of a 
conflict, the duty of loyalty would not permit exceptions to provide 
an incremental benefit to be obtained from adhering to the duty of 
care.  The duty of loyalty prevails over the duty of care as the fiduciary 
first must “do no harm.”  Any benefit the fiduciary bestows upon the 
principal through positive acts is secondary.  In the sections that 
follow, three areas of fiduciary law will be examined to show that 
courts apply these principles in their superintendence of fiduciary 
duties to settle conflicts between enforcing the duty of loyalty and the 
duty of care.240  The three areas are (i) attorney-client relationships; 
(ii) the responsibilities of financial advisers; and (iii) the duties of 
directors and trustees. 
                                                          
 240. I shall not address situations where duties of loyalty conflict with one another 
or where duties of care conflict with other duties of care.  Conflicting duties of loyalty 
seldom arise.  As negative duties, they generally require inactions or omissions and 
rarely give rise to a conflict because the fiduciary should face no difficulty in 
performing any number of omissions at once.  See JEREMY WALDRON, Rights in Conflict, 
in LIBERAL RIGHTS, COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991, at 203, 213-14 (1993) (describing 
how many traditional liberal rights, such as free speech or freedom of religion, are 
negative rights which should not conflict because they require the constrained not to 
act).  An attorney, for example, should face no conflict in maintaining the 
confidentiality of multiple clients.  As long as the attorney remains silent, he has not 
breached his duty of loyalty.  Similarly, a financial adviser, like all fiduciaries, has a 
duty of loyalty to refrain from self-dealing.  It should present no conflict for the 
fiduciary to omit from doing so. 
Conflicting duties of care are ubiquitous and require the fiduciary to allocate 
scarce resources among multiple principals.  Should an attorney spend her time 
preparing one case or another; should a financial advisor place a limited opportunity 
investment in the account of one client or another?  While conflicting duties of care 
raise hard issues with regard to dividing scarce resources, they do not raise true 
conflicts where fulfilling the duty to one principal requires breaching the duty to 
another.  See Henderson, Jr. & Pearson, supra note 177, at 1430 (discussing how 
aspiration, or the duty to act, only requires agents to act to the best of their abilities 
given the resources available to them and not to cease to act on everything else). 
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A. Attorneys and Clients 
Attorneys representing multiple clients often face conflicts, such as 
determining whether to breach one client’s confidentiality to 
promote the defense of a second.  As mentioned in Part I, the Third 
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers addresses conflicts in 
multiple representation by requiring consent.241  But consent in many 
cases may be difficult or impossible to obtain.  Recall Arizona v. 
Macumber,242 where the court, during Macumber’s murder trial, opted 
to protect the confidentiality of a deceased client although the 
deceased’s own attorneys were prepared to testify that the client had 
confessed to the same crimes of which Macumber was accused.  
Obtaining consent was not possible; the court had to resolve the 
conflict. 
1. Loyalty and care 
The analysis in Part II suggests that Macumber presents a classic 
dilemma between upholding the duty of loyalty or the duty of care.  
The duty of loyalty required the two attorneys representing the 
deceased to maintain his confidentiality.243  Every attorney knows that, 
absent consent by the client, an attorney generally has a duty to keep 
his clients’ secrets.244  In Macumber, the attorneys’ testimony would 
have resulted in a breach of confidentiality—a breach of the duty of 
loyalty.245  The duty of care, on the other hand, required Macumber’s 
attorney to marshal evidence of his client’s innocence.  It is the 
attorney’s duty to “present the client’s case in the most favorable 
possible light.”246  The amount of evidence the attorney must present 
is open-ended, but what better evidence to present than testimony 
that another person had confessed to the alleged crimes.  The court 
resolved the conflict by preserving confidentiality (enforcing the duty 
of loyalty), even if it resulted in a less effective defense (inconsistent 
with the duty of care). 
                                                          
 241. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 242. 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976). 
 243. See In re Am. Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 619 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that the 
obligation of confidentiality to a client forms part of the lawyer’s primary duty of 
loyalty); Diversified Group, Inc. v. Daugerdas, 139 F. Supp. 2d 445, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (characterizing the duty of loyalty and the duty of confidentiality as 
interconnected). 
 244. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2004) (stating that “[a] 
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless 
the client gives informed consent”). 
 245. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text. 
 246. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984). 
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The decision in this case is remarkable for several reasons.  First, 
the client to whom the duty of loyalty was owed was already dead.  
While death does not vitiate the attorney-client privilege at common 
law, when determining whether to uphold the privilege against 
countervailing interests, the fact that the holder of the privilege is 
deceased militates against preserving it at significant cost.  Second, 
the deceased’s attorneys were present in court and willing to waive 
the privilege on his behalf.247  While normally the privilege belongs to 
the client and is not the attorney’s to waive, here the client was 
unavailable.  Finally, the countervailing interests were significant 
because a potentially innocent person may have been convicted.  
Notwithstanding these considerations, the duty of loyalty trumped 
the duty of care.248 
In Macumber, the court was presented with two fiduciaries owing 
duties to two principals.  In most cases, a single fiduciary has multiple 
clients and is faced with a conflict between or among them.  
Practicing attorneys often are faced with such conflicts after their 
representation has commenced.  An attorney, at the outset of a case, 
may envision no conflict in multiple representation and the clients 
may even consent to it.  The emergence of a single piece of evidence, 
however, can lead to unforeseen dilemmas.249  Such conflicts often 
occur in ineffective assistance of counsel cases.250  Attorneys during 
trial may be forced to utilize or forgo a particular strategy or tactic 
that, while assisting one client, harms another.  As a result, the non-
prevailing party may claim, after the fact, denial of effective assistance 
of counsel.251  In these cases, attorneys during the course of trial 
                                                          
 247. Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1086. 
 248. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text. 
 249. This dilemma appeared briefly in the criminal trial of Martha Stewart for 
conspiracy to obstruct justice and obstruction of justice.  See Superseding Indictment 
at ¶¶ 38, 55, United States v. Stewart, S1 03 Cr. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/mstewart/usmspb10504sind.html (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2005).  In the underlying facts related to the criminal matter, one person 
allegedly tipped a second through a third party, but both the tipper and tippee 
denied that the tip occurred.  The third party reportedly indicated after the start of 
the trial that the alleged tip came from someone other than the tipper.  Such 
evidence, of course, would tend to exonerate the tipper, but it could implicate the 
tippee by showing she indeed received a tip, it just came from someone else.  
Highlighting the new evidence, therefore, could damage the tippee’s case 
significantly.  See Constance L. Hays, Setback for Prosecutors in the Martha Stewart Trial, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2004, at C1 (stating, “The document is not likely to help Ms. 
Stewart, since it supports the notion that she received information that led to her 
stock trade.  But it could lend weight to Mr. Bacanovic’s argument that he did 
nothing wrong.”). 
 250. See, e.g., United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1991) (illustrating an 
ineffective assistance of counsel motion arising from multiple representation). 
 251. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 129 cmt. c (2000) 
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instinctively treat a breach of the duty of loyalty more seriously than a 
breach of the duty of care and tend to uphold the former even if it 
means breaching the latter. 
This phenomenon became apparent in the criminal case Glasser v. 
United States.252  In Glasser, William Stewart represented two 
defendants in a bribery trial.253  During the proceedings, several 
situations arose where Stewart was forced to decide between 
upholding the duty of loyalty to one client or the duty of care to the 
other, but not both.254  First, an accountant (Brantman) testified he 
acted as a conduit for the payment of a bribe to a defendant 
(Kretske), but Brantman said he did not know, and had nothing to 
do with, the second defendant (Glasser).255  The payer of the 
purported bribe (Abosketes) testified to the contrary that Brantman 
and Glasser were affiliated.256  Brantman was later recalled to the 
stand, but Stewart declined to question him, leaving the impression 
that Abosketes was correct and that Brantman was affiliated with 
Glasser.257  Stewart later told the court of his concern that his 
questioning would have elicited further damaging evidence against 
Kretske, and he believed that it was better to leave well enough 
alone.258  Cross-examination could have cast doubt on Abosketes’s 
testimony and was necessary to develop Brantman’s lack of 
knowledge about Glasser.259  The Court noted, “Stewart’s failure to 
undertake such a cross-examination luminates the cross-purposes 
under which he was laboring.”260  In addition to this incident, Stewart 
                                                          
(noting, “Witnesses who would be favorable to one defendant might be subject to 
cross-examination that would be unfavorable to another defendant.  In closing 
argument, counsel must choose which facts to stress.  For example, stressing the 
minor role of one defendant might imply the major role of another.”). 
 252. 315 U.S. 60 (1941). 
 253. Two defendants, Glasser and Kretske, assistant United States attorneys in 
Chicago during the 1930s, were found guilty of conspiracy to defraud the United 
States.  Id. at 63.  The defendants solicited bribes from certain persons charged or 
about to be charged with violations of federal internal revenue laws relating to the 
sale of liquor.  Id. at 64.  Shortly before the start of trial, an attorney named William 
Scott Stewart entered his appearance for Glasser and the law firm of Harrington & 
McDonnell entered its appearance for Kretske.  Id. at 68.  On the day of trial, 
McDonnell informed the court that Kretske did not want McDonnell as his lawyer.  
Id.  The judge, therefore, asked Stewart, Glasser’s attorney, to represent Kretske as 
well.  Id. at 68-69.  After a discussion among the judge, Stewart, McDonnell, Kretske, 
and Glasser, the court appointed Stewart as attorney for Kretske, and Stewart 
represented both Glasser and Kretske throughout the trial.  Id. 
 254. Id. at 72-77. 
 255. Id. at 72. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 73. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
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also failed to object to certain statements admissible as to Kretske, but 
not Glasser.261  Glasser contended that the statements were 
inadmissible hearsay as to him and that Stewart failed to object on 
Glasser’s behalf because the jury may have drawn a negative inference 
that the testimony was true as to Kretske.262 
These are both examples of acts that Stewart could have taken in 
furtherance of his duty of care to Glasser.  Taking these steps, 
however, would have harmed Kretske’s defense and Stewart opted to 
stay silent.263  The Court recognized that the harm to Glasser was only 
incremental and found that “Stewart’s representation of Glasser was 
not as effective as it might have been if the appointment had not 
been made.”264  The Court confessed it is “difficult” to determine “the 
precise degree of prejudice sustained by Glasser as a result of the 
court’s appointment of Stewart as counsel for Kretske.”265  The breach 
of duty to Glasser, therefore, was in the nature of a breach of the duty 
of care.266  But had Stewart taken the steps discussed, he could have 
harmed Kretske.  The potential breach of the duty to Kretske, 
therefore, was in the nature of the duty of loyalty.  Stewart 
instinctively opted to preserve the duty of loyalty owed to Kretske, 
even though the result was a diminution in the quality of Glasser’s 
defense. 
2. Acts and omissions 
The strategy and tactics deployed in Glasser also reflect the 
sentiment that one generally treats harm from failing to act more 
leniently than harm from committing an act.  On both occasions, the 
attorney Stewart decided that he was better off by staying silent, even 
if that meant providing less effective representation for one, than by 
speaking and causing harm to the other.267  This strategy is consistent 
with the general perception that one ought to leave well enough 
                                                          
 261. Id. at 74.  Three witnesses testified that they heard Kretske make statements 
that Kretske would have to see “Red” or send the money to the “red-head,” 
apparently a reference to Glasser, who had red hair. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 73-74. 
 264. Id. at 76. 
 265. Id. at 75-76. 
 266. In the end, the Court held that Glasser was denied effective assistance of 
counsel.  Id. at 76.  The Court recognized that the trial judge put Stewart in an 
untenable position and ordered a new trial as to Glasser.  Id. 
 267. See also Flatt v. Super. Ct., 885 P.2d 950, 959 (Cal. 1994) (holding that a 
lawyer in a firm has no duty, when severing representation of one client, to advise 
him regarding contemplated lawsuit against another client of the firm).  
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alone by not taking any action that may make matters worse.  The 
physicians’ Hippocratic Oath begins, “Above all, do no harm.”268 
Why omissions are treated more leniently than acts, and whether 
such distinctions are appropriate or even possible, has been 
addressed in the context of criminal and tort law.  In 1908, Francis 
Bohlen, upon whom William Prosser relied heavily in his classic 
treatise, wrote, “There is no distinction more deeply rooted in the 
common law and more fundamental than that between misfeasance 
and non-feasance, between active misconduct working positive injury 
to others and passive in action, a failure to take positive steps to 
benefit others.”269  Bohlen recognized, however, that the difference 
between acts and omissions, while obvious in theory, can be difficult 
in practice.  Bohlen maintained, “There is a borderland in which the 
act is of a mixed character, partaking of the nature of both.”270  He 
wrote that the test of whether something is an act or omission is 
whether the victim is “positively worse off as a result.”271  In the case of 
an omission, the victim is “in reality no worse off at all . . . he is 
merely deprived of a protection which . . . would have benefited 
him.”272  In his book Bad Acts and Guilty Minds, Leo Katz more recently 
described the test as whether the harmful outcome would have 
occurred the way it did if the defendant did not exist.273 
Professor Katz provides several reasons why omissions are treated 
differently from acts, which are relevant to fiduciary law.  First, a rule 
prohibiting omissions (requiring acts), as opposed to a rule 
prohibiting commissions, is difficult to draft.274  This difficulty 
permeates the doctrine of the duty of care and, as discussed, courts 
have expressed that no specific set of rules can establish what the duty 
of care entails.275  Second, punishing omissions may be 
counterproductive because it could result in forbearance.  As 
fiduciary duties become more robust, some argue, fewer individuals 
                                                          
 268. Oath of Hippocrates, in HIPPOCRATIC WRITINGS (J. Chadwick & W.N. Mann 
trans., 1950), available at http://www.med.umich.edu/irbmed/ethics/hippocratic.-
hippocratic.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2004). 
 269. Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. 
PA. L. REV. 217, 219 (1908), quoted in WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
TORTS 338-39 (1971). 
 270. Id. at 220, quoted in WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 
(1971). 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. See LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS 143 (1987) (recognizing 
limitations with this test and noting that counterfactual assumptions are inherently 
ambiguous and potentially contradictory). 
 274. Id. at 144. 
 275. See supra Part II.B.1.b. 
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will accept their responsibilities.276  Third, the consequences of an 
omission are more difficult to ascertain than those of an act.  
Assessing the consequences of an omission requires speculating as to 
what might have transpired had the act occurred; assessing the 
consequences of an act requires observing events that actually 
occurred. 
A deeper reason why omissions are treated differently from acts 
focuses on individualism and personal autonomy.  Bohlen wrote, 
“This distinction is founded on that attitude of extreme individualism 
so typical of anglo-saxon legal thought.”277  A failure to act that results 
in harm is tantamount to failure to give up or to risk something the 
non-actor owns—time, money, safety—whereas acting that results in 
harm takes away something owned by the victim.  Only the latter case 
violates our sense of personal autonomy.  Similarly, prohibiting an act 
leaves the person free to perform any number of alternative acts—all 
acts except the prohibited one—whereas prohibiting an omission 
effectively requires the person to perform the single act the omission 
of which is prohibited.  The latter is far more burdensome.278 
The distinction between acts and omissions helps to explain why 
duties of omission trump duties of commission, and why duties of loyalty 
trump duties of care.  The common law has been more willing to 
hold an actor responsible for an act than for a failure to act.  As 
discussed, holding one responsible for an act which causes harm 
addresses a breach of the duty of loyalty.  Holding one responsible 
for failing to act addresses a breach of the duty of care.  To the extent 
that that the law treats acts more seriously than omissions, it makes 
sense that the law treats a breach of the duty of loyalty more seriously 
than a breach of the duty of care.279 
                                                          
 276. See, e.g., Claudia H. Deutsch, The Higher Price of Staying Public, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
23, 2005, at BU5 (reporting that for many companies, burdens of operating 
registered public company after passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act outweigh benefits); 
Tony Tassel, Europeans Fall Out of Love with Listing in New York, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 3, 
2004, at 14 (reporting that Sarbanes-Oxley is causing many foreign companies to 
reconsider merits of listing in the U.S.); Richard A. Epstein, Sarbanes Overdose, NAT’L  
L.J., Jan. 27, 2003, at A17 (arguing that fewer persons are willing to serve as 
corporate directors after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
 277. Bohlen, supra note 269, at 220. 
 278. See KATZ, supra note 273, at 144-45 (noting that removing one’s autonomy 
and mandating action seems more offensive than simply prohibiting certain actions). 
 279. It is interesting to examine cases where courts set aside this rule and permit a 
breach of client confidentiality in the face of competing fiduciary duties.  For 
example, in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit focused on the common law doctrine known as the 
fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege.  In that case, shareholders of a 
life insurance company brought a securities fraud class action against the company 
and certain of its officers, directors, and controlling shareholders.  Id. at 1095.  In the 
course of the lawsuit, the plaintiffs requested information from R. Richard 
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The Third Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers confirms 
this approach.280  The Restatement on its face addresses conflicts of 
duty in multiple representation by requiring consent.  It provides, 
“Unless all affected clients consent . . . a lawyer . . . may not . . . 
represent two or more clients.”281  However, a closer look at the 
Restatement reveals an important qualifier and betrays the 
Restatement’s true concerns.  The prohibition in civil and non-
litigated matters, absent consent, applies only when the lawyer’s 
representation of one client would “materially and adversely” be 
affected by the duties to another client, or when the lawyer would 
represent one client against another client, even if in an unrelated 
matter.282  The prohibition, therefore, is limited to situations where 
the attorney would take an action adverse to, or harming, a client in 
violation of his duty of loyalty.  When noting the rationale for the 
rules, the Restatement reporters made plain the concern for 
“material and adverse consequences for the disadvantaged client” 
and the lawyer’s requirement “to remain loyal to clients and protect 
their confidential information.”283  Thus, while on its face the 
                                                          
Schweitzer, who was company counsel during the relevant time (although he later 
became the company’s president).  Id. at 1096.  The company’s subsequent counsel 
(at the time of the lawsuit) objected to the requests.  Id.  The new counsel argued 
that communications between Schweitzer and the company, which took place while 
Schweitzer was acting as counsel, were privileged.  Id.  In response, the shareholders 
argued that the privilege is not available to the company where the company’s 
shareholders are the very persons making the demand, and the lower court agreed.  
Id. 
The court of appeals recognized that it was faced with competing interests of 
confidentiality and disclosure.  Id. at 1100.  The court opted for disclosure.  It 
explained that the lawyer’s client here is the company itself and that the company 
functions for the benefit of the very same persons seeking the information.  Id. at 
1101.  The court reasoned that management owes ultimate allegiance to the 
shareholders and should not be permitted to assert a privilege that would detract 
from their receiving information vital to their case.  Id. 
The court, however, appeared reluctant to hold that the shareholders’ right to 
information trumped the attorney’s duty of confidentiality.  Instead, the court 
suggested that the ability to waive the privilege lay not with the company as an entity 
attempting to assert the privilege, but rather, with the collective of the shareholders.  
Id. at 1103-04.  This suggestion is inconsistent with the view of many courts and 
commentators who insist that directors and officers owe duties to the corporation as 
an entity as well as to the corporation’s shareholders.  See HENRY G. HENN & JOHN R. 
ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS §§ 231-232 (3d ed. 1983).  The court tried to fit 
the attorney-client communication into traditional exceptions to the privilege but 
concluded it was unable to do so.  Garner, 430 F.2d at 1102-03.  Courts continue to 
apply the doctrine in a variety of fiduciary relationships.  See, e.g., Stenovich v. 
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, 756 N.Y.S.2d 367, 376 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (collecting 
cases). 
 280. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 128 (2000). 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. §§ 128, 130.  In criminal cases, the rule is stricter due to constitutional 
concerns.  Id. § 129. 
 283. Id. §§ 128 cmt. b, 130 cmt. b. 
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Restatement’s approach to address conflicts among clients is to 
require consent, the Restatement is more concerned with violations 
of the duty of loyalty than with breaches of the duty of care. 
B. Financial Firms 
1. The duty to disclose 
In cases involving conflicts of duty in financial firms, discussed 
above, courts hold that confidential information obtained by the firm 
from one client may not be disclosed to other clients of the firm.284  
Thus, while customers may argue that a firm has a duty to disclose 
material information bearing on their investments even if the 
information is confidential, courts, some invoking a property theory, 
have ruled that the firms have a duty to protect the information.  One 
court, Cotton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, concluded that 
between the two duties, the duty of confidentiality is undeniably more 
important.285  Cotton  can be viewed as a conflict between upholding 
the duty of loyalty to the investment banking client by maintaining its 
confidentiality, on the one hand, and upholding the duty of care to 
investors by disclosing information to assist them in their investment 
decisions, on the other.  The duty to maintain client confidentiality 
trumps the duty to disclose information to assist the firm’s customers.  
The court held there was no affirmative duty to speak to the 
customers and quoted Basic Inc. v. Levinson for the proposition that 
silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading.286  The firm in 
Cotton was not liable for failure to disclose the confidential 
information. 
Similar cases are resolved differently if the financial firms take 
affirmative steps to mislead investors.  If Merrill Lynch, for example, 
had advised investors to sell their shares when it knew the price would 
rise, that advice would have been tantamount to a misleading 
statement and a violation of the duty of loyalty.  Such affirmatively 
misleading communications have been a flashpoint compelling a 
different outcome in other cases.  Recall Black v. Shearson, Hammill & 
Company.287  Shearson Hammill was touting the stock of a company 
while a Shearson partner sat on the company’s board and knew it was 
                                                          
 284. Cotton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 699 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. 
Okla. 1988). 
 285. Id. at 256 (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 
6668, 40 SEC Docket 907, 916 (Nov. 8, 1961)). 
 286. Id. (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)). 
 287. 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (Ct. App. 1968). 
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faltering.288  When asked about the company’s prospects, the partner 
suggested it was performing well, and he failed to provide the 
complete picture.289  When Shearson was challenged, it responded 
that the partner did not know his statements were false when he 
made them, and that in any case he had a fiduciary duty to the issuer 
not to reveal confidential information.290  But the court found 
culpability in Black because the individual realized subsequently that 
his previous statements were false.291  He “permitted them to stand 
after he learned the truth and before respondents relied on them.  
His knowledge and approval of the statements, accompanied by his 
knowledge of the truth about [the issuer], were elements in a 
continuing course of conduct.”292  The court ruled the firm had a 
duty of disclosure to its investor clients and upheld punitive damages 
against the individual because he acted with malice.293 
The SEC has reached similar conclusions in cases with similar facts.  
In one case, Van Alstyne, Noel & Co.,294 the SEC was required to 
determine if a broker-dealer should be sanctioned for making 
positive statements about a company when the broker possessed 
material negative non-public information about the company as a 
result of an underwriting relationship.295  The broker argued it was 
under no duty to disclose negative information to its customers 
because, among other reasons, the information was confidential.296  
The SEC disagreed, stating that once the broker released positive 
information about the company, it had a duty to disclose negative 
                                                          
 288. Id. at 159. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 160. 
 292. Id.  Courts before and after this case have recognized liability where the 
defendants have failed to correct prior statements.  Such cases typically find liability 
under the “duty to correct” doctrine, where the defendants learn after making the 
statements that they were false.  This doctrine is occasionally confused with a “duty to 
update,” which is a duty to revise statements that, while true when made, became 
false or misleading over time.  For a discussion of these doctrines, see Int’l Bus. Mach. 
Corp. Sec. Litig., 163 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 1998), Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 
F.3d 1410, 1430-33 (3d Cir. 1997), and COX ET AL., supra note 19, at 750-52. 
 293. Black, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 162. 
 294. Exchange Act Release No. 4699, 33 SEC Docket 311 (Apr. 8, 1952). 
 295. Van Alstyne acted as both broker and dealer in the shares of Expreso Aereo 
Inter-Americano, S.A., and as an underwriter for an offering of the company’s shares.  
Id. at 312-13.  As a result, Van Alstyne had information indicating that Expreso was 
operating at increasing losses.  Id. at 313.  Nevertheless, Van Alstyne made optimistic 
statements to other dealers in Expreso stock about the company’s prospects, 
including that “the situation looked ‘very good’ and [that] the company could show 
‘black figures’ when one or two planes were put in operation.”  Id. at 313-17.  Van 
Alstyne also made similar statements to private investors.  Id. at 332-36. 
 296. Id. at 334. 
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information as well.297  The firm should have simply refrained from 
making statements regarding the company’s prospects.  The SEC 
wrote, “Having chosen to continue to effect transactions in [the] 
stock, registrant should have refrained from making any statements 
which would be rendered misleading by the failure to disclose such 
financial information.”298  Once it “volunteered optimistic 
information” about the company’s prospects, “it was bound also to 
disclose at least generally the extent and trend of [the company’s] 
losses.”299 
2. Tort law 
The reasoning in these cases is consistent with traditional tort 
doctrine of the duty to render assistance to others.  Under the old 
common law rule, one does not have a Good Samaritan duty to 
voluntarily render aid to others.300  If one places another in danger, or 
exposes him to hardship, however, then one has a duty to keep the 
risk from materializing into harm.  The owner of a bar, for example, 
was liable for expelling an intoxicated customer, who became drunk 
on the premises, after the customer died from exposure to the 
elements.301  Similarly, a business host was liable to his guest when the 
guest took ill and the host refused him permission to spend the night 
and placed him, helpless, in his horse-drawn sleigh, from which he 
fell and was injured.302  In his treatise, Prosser wrote that “if the 
                                                          
 297. Id. at 321.  The Commission stated, 
[W]hen registrant disseminated favorable and optimistic information with 
respect to Expreso’s condition and prospects, it made itself subject to an 
overriding duty of disclosure to its customers.  Registrant should have 
appreciated that giving to a customer favorable or optimistic information 
and withholding unfavorable information which it considered confidential 
would be misleading and unfair to the customer. 
Id.   
 298. Id. 
 299. Id.  It was no excuse that the broker-dealer actually believed the company’s 
long-term prospects were good.  The opinion stated, 
[E]ven assuming that it was reasonable for registrant to believe until that 
time that Expreso had a bright future, registrant nevertheless owed a duty to 
its customers, with whom it was dealing and to whom optimistic statements 
were made, to disclose Expreso’s deteriorating financial condition and also, 
perhaps, that previous optimistic statements had not materialized. 
Id. at 324 (footnote omitted). 
 300. See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Capier, 72 P. 281, 283 (Kan. 1903) (noting that, 
while the “moral law” mandates that one must rescue a person in danger, the “law of 
the land” does not require such action); see also WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF 
THE LAW OF TORTS 340 (1971) (stating that “the law has persistently refused to 
recognize the moral obligation of common decency and common humanity, to come 
to the aid of another human being who is in danger, even though the outcome is to 
cost him his life”). 
 301. Weymire v. Wolfe, 3 N.W. 541, 543 (Iowa 1879). 
 302. Depue v. Flateau, 111 N.W. 1, 2 (Minn. 1907). 
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defendant’s own negligence has been responsible for the plaintiff’s 
situation, a relation has arisen which imposes a duty to make a 
reasonable effort to give assistance, and avoid any further harm.”303 
Traditional tort doctrine demonstrates why Black and Van Alstyne 
were decided differently from Cotton.  In none of the three cases—
Black, Van Alstyne, or Cotton—could the firm breach its duty of 
confidentiality, but in Cotton, the firm was not culpable for failing to 
disclose the confidential information to investor clients, whereas in 
Black and in Van Alstyne the firms were liable.  The key difference is 
that in Black and Van Alstyne, the firms took positive acts to place the 
customers in peril—they made affirmative misstatements to them—
whereas in Cotton, the firm simply failed to speak; the employees 
remained silent and offered no advice on matters about which they 
had confidential information.304  This case demonstrates that, when 
upholding a duty of loyalty to one person (preserving 
confidentiality), one may not breach a duty of loyalty (affirmative 
misstatements) to another.  As the Supreme Court has stated, “Lying 
is inconsistent with the duty of loyalty owed by all fiduciaries.”305  But 
one may uphold one’s duty of loyalty by preserving confidentiality 
even if it means not acting in accordance with one’s duty of care by 
disclosing relevant information.  In that sense,  Cotton echoes Arizona 
v. Macumber306 regarding the duty of confidentiality to the deceased.  
When forced to resolve a conflict, courts uphold the duty of loyalty if 
the result is merely a breach of the duty of care. 
The result in these cases is consistent with the distinction between 
perfect and imperfect duties discussed in Part II.  One must always 
fulfill a perfect duty even if it results in a breach of an imperfect duty.  
But one may not breach a perfect duty and claim that doing so was 
necessary to fulfill another perfect duty.307  If questioned on a matter 
                                                          
 303. PROSSER, supra note 300, at 342. 
 304. See Note, Conflicting Duties of Brokerage Firms, 88 HARV. L. REV. 396, 403 (1974) 
(noting that Black and van Alstyne imposed liability on the broker without taking into 
consideration that he had a duty to his investors). 
 305. Variety v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996). 
 306. 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976). 
 307. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY is consistent with this proposition.  A 
comment to section 381 provides: 
[I]t is normally understood that [an agent] is not to communicate to the 
principal any information which he already has, or which he acquired during 
the performance of the agency, the disclosure of which to the principal 
would be a breach of duty to a third person, as when an attorney, having 
acquired confidential information from a client, is subsequently employed by 
another client to conduct a transaction in which the information is relevant.  
If the attorney cannot perform his duty to the second client without 
disclosing such information or using it to the disadvantage of the first, he 
should decline to act. 
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about which one has confidential information, one must remain 
silent.  If the truth calls for breaching confidentiality, the only option 
is to say nothing at all.   
But is this explanation consistent with Tarasoff v. Regents of the 
University of California?308  The court in Tarasoff held that the 
confidentiality of the patient-psychotherapist relationship must yield 
to prevent a threatened danger to another.309  Prosenjit Poddar told 
his therapist in no uncertain terms that he was going to kill Tatiana 
Tarasoff.310  The threat presented a clear and specific danger to 
Tarasoff, so much so that the therapist contacted campus police and 
decided Poddar should be committed for observation.311  The key 
point in Tarasoff is the court held that the legislature provided for an 
exception, in advance, to the patient-psychotherapist privilege.  
Under the circumstances, the privilege simply did not exist.  The 
court quoted both the relevant statute as well as rules of professional 
ethics to show not that the duty of confidentiality was breached and 
that the breach was justified, but rather that no duty of confidentiality 
existed in the first place.312  Recall it is not the case that perfect duties 
permit no exceptions. Rather, they permit no exceptions in the 
interest of inclination asserted as an afterthought.  A prohibition, like 
in Tarasoff, may be subject to limiting conditions contained in the law 
itself.313 
3. Omissions and acts 
Another way of looking at these cases is that they turn on the 
difference between acts and omissions.314  The law generally treats 
omissions more leniently than acts.  In Black and Van Alstyne, the 
firms made misleading statements about the prospects of particular 
companies, while in Cotton, the firm merely refrained from acting.  
Even in Tarasoff, the victim’s parents alleged certain affirmative 
conduct in addition to the failure to warn.  While Poddar’s therapist 
first sent a letter to the police requesting assistance in securing 
                                                          
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 cmt. e (1958). 
 308. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). 
 309. Id. at 347. 
 310. Id. at 339. 
 311. Id. at 341. 
 312. Id. at 347. 
 313. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (explaining that conditions are 
often formulaic in prohibitions). 
 314. Generally, the distinction between acts and omissions may not be salient for 
fiduciaries, who have a duty to be candid.  DeMott, supra note 1, at 906.  This 
distinction is important, however, when attempting to resolve conflicts of duties 
among principals. 
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Poddar’s confinement, the director of psychiatry subsequently took 
action by asking the police to return the letter and destroy any copies, 
and by ordering no action be taken to place Poddar in treatment.315   
The distinction between acts and omissions, however, as Professor 
Bohlen noted long ago, is often difficult in practice.316  In Black, the 
individual partner may have believed his statements were true when 
he made them.  That fact is important because one could argue that 
he did not act inappropriately at all, but rather that he was guilty only 
of the sin of omission when he failed to revise his earlier statement 
once he realized that it was untrue.  Under that reasoning, he is no 
longer guilty of an act but rather an omission.  The act-omission 
distinction raises similar questions in Van Alstyne.  In that matter, the 
SEC’s view was not that the firm had repeated a false statement, but 
rather that the firm provided certain favorable information about the 
company while withholding unfavorable information.  Looked at in 
this way, the firm was guilty of an omission, not an act. 
So is it possible to characterize these omitted statements as acts?  
Courts have held that, while one does not have a generalized duty to 
disclose all material information, once a person has revealed some 
relevant information, further silence or failure to disclose a relevant 
material fact is prohibited.317  The federal securities laws prohibit a 
material omission as well as a misstatement, but only if the omitted 
act is necessary to make a previous statement not misleading.318  A 
duty to disclose—to “speak the full truth”—arises only after the 
speaker undertakes to act.319  As mentioned, “Silence, absent a duty to 
disclose, is not misleading.”320  In state corporate law, an obligation to 
disclose all material facts arises once a director voluntarily undertakes 
                                                          
 315. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 341. 
 316. See supra note 270 and accompanying text. 
 317. See generally First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1317 (5th Cir. 
1977) (noting that a duty to disclose the whole truth begins when a fiduciary chooses 
to reveal relevant information); Grossman v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 395, 
409 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (stating, if a company “chooses to reveal relevant, material 
information even though it had no duty to do so, it must disclose the whole truth.”). 
 318. See, e.g., Securities Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2000) (prohibiting 
obtaining money or property “by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or 
any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made . . . not misleading”).  Similarly, under Rule 10b-5, it is unlawful “to make any 
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading.”  Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 
(2002).  See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths:  Protecting Mistaken Inferences 
by Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REV. 87, 94 (1999) (arguing that prohibiting half-
truths, like prohibiting outright fraud, is efficient). 
 319. First Va. Bankshares, 559 F.2d at 1317. 
 320. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1987). 
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to make disclosures.321  Similarly, in tort law, taking a gratuitous 
affirmative act to assist a person in need may create a new duty to 
provide the assistance needed in the first place.  According to the 
Second Restatement of Torts, if a bystander initiates a rescue attempt, 
the bystander cannot leave the victim in a worse position than when 
the rescuer took charge.322  Thus, providing incomplete disclosure 
may be viewed as an act, putting the recipient of the information in a 
worse position than if the partial disclosure had never been made.323  
Tarasoff is analogous.  While Tarasoff is considered a failure to warn 
case, the acts taken by the director of psychiatry—the order to destroy 
the therapist’s letter and the order to take no action to place Poddar 
in a treatment facility—may well have placed Tatiana in even more 
peril than she was in before those acts occurred. 
4. Information barriers 
A final point regarding financial firms is that they now often are 
required to structure themselves, through the use of barriers to the 
flow of information—sometimes referred to as “Chinese Walls”—to 
ensure they do not breach the duty of loyalty, even if the structure 
results in a diminution of the duty of care.324  To address concerns 
                                                          
 321. See, e.g., Ciro, Inc. v. Gold, 816 F. Supp. 253, 266 (D. Del. 1993) (“[O]nce 
directors voluntarily undertake to make certain disclosures to the stockholders, they 
are obligated, under the so-called duty of complete candor, to disclose all material 
facts.”); Kahn v. Roberts, Civ.A.No. 12,324, 1994 WL 70118, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 
1994) (asserting that the duty of full disclosure attaches to directors once they 
voluntarily decide to disclose information relevant to a corporate transaction), aff’d, 
679 A.2d 460 (Del. 1996). 
 322. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (1965); see also PROSSER, supra note 
300, at 343 (“If there is no duty to come to the assistance of a person in difficulty or 
peril, there is at least a duty to avoid any affirmative acts which make his situation 
worse.”). 
 323. The case law deciding conflicts of duty supports that an omission can be 
considered an act when a recommendation to purchase is made while in possession 
of non-public information not disclosed.  See Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 
1969) (noting that when a recommendation is made, the salesman implies that he 
has conducted research into essential information relating to the security).  The 
court continued, “Where the salesman lacks essential information about a security, 
he should disclose this as well as the risks which arise from his lack of information."  
Id.  See also Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 94,329 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 1974).  The SEC agreed with the Court’s ruling in Slade.  See Brief 
for SEC as amicus curiae, Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., No. 74-1537 (2d Cir., 
appeal allowed April 19, 1974) (“Rule 10b-5 prohibits a recommendation contrary to 
facts about the security in question known by the broker-dealer”); Lawrence A. 
Hammermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob:  The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Disclosure 
Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1167-68 (1996) (discussing the difference between the 
affirmative duty of disclosure and the avoidance of material misstatements or 
omissions). 
 324. See Christopher M. Gormam, Note, Are Chinese Walls the Best Solution to the 
Problems of Insider Trading and Conflicts of Interest in Broker-Deals?, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 475, 486-87 (2004) (stating that the SEC believes that Chinese Walls are both 
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about disclosure of confidential information, financial firms 
developed compliance mechanisms to prevent the flow of non-public 
information from one part of the firm to another.  Thus, while 
preserving the confidentiality of certain clients, the firms may fail, 
inconsistent with the duty of care, to provide important information 
to others.  The SEC encouraged the use of such procedures as early 
as 1968 in a settled administrative proceeding with Merrill Lynch.325  
The use of these procedures was formalized in 1980 when the SEC 
adopted a rule to address insider trading in the context of tender 
offers.326  In adopting the rule, the SEC recognized that, while 
protecting confidentiality, the procedures might result in an 
incremental decrease in the benefits to certain customers: 
These present practices include the use of so-called ‘Chinese Walls’ 
which are used to isolate the nonpublic flow of information from 
one department to the rest of the institution.  Depending on the 
circumstances, it may be appropriate to advise customers of its use 
of the Chinese Wall, because the institution would not be using all 
information that it had received to the benefit of a particular 
customer.327 
A new insider trading rule, Rule 10b5-1, parrots the language of 
the tender offer rule.  The rule addresses when a purchase or sale is 
considered “on the basis of” material non-public information for 
insider trading purposes.  The rule provides that a firm may 
demonstrate that a purchase or sale was not “on the basis of” inside 
information if, among other things, the firm has such information 
barriers in place.328  In April 2003, these procedures were included as 
                                                          
important and necessary in financial firms). 
 325. In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1967-1969 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,629 (Nov. 25, 1968).  In that matter, the SEC 
staff alleged that insider trading principles prohibited the disclosure of non-public 
information to favored customers who may sell their shares before the information is 
publicly disclosed.  Id.  The Commission stated that in determining to settle the 
proceedings, it considered the firm’s undertaking to implement procedures to 
prohibit disclosure of material information obtained from a client but not yet 
disclosed to the public.  Id. at 83,350. 
 326. The tender offer rule generally requires any person to disclose-or-abstain if in 
possession of material non-public information regarding a tender offer, and if the 
information was obtained from the person making the offer, the company whose 
securities are to be sold, or anyone acting on their behalf.  Transactions in Securities 
on the Basis of Material, Nonpublic Information in the Context of Tender Offers, 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1980).  But the SEC provided an exception from the disclose-
or-abstain rule if the person making the investment decision did not actually know of 
the non-public information and if the firm implemented procedures to prevent the 
person from knowing the information.  17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(b). 
 327. Tender Offers, Securities Act Release No. 6239, 45 Fed. Reg. 60410, 60415 
(Sept. 12, 1980). 
 328. Exchange Act Rule 10b5-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2004); see also Selective 
Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881 (Aug. 15, 2000) 
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part of a global settlement of enforcement actions against ten large 
firms alleging that investment banking departments exercised 
improper influence over research departments to curry favor with 
certain clients and generate investment banking business.329  Thus, 
the decision to resolve the conflict between preserving 
confidentiality, consistent with the duty of loyalty, and promoting 
disclosure, consistent with the duty of care, has been resolved in favor 
of the duty of loyalty through compliance procedures sanctioned by 
the courts and the SEC. 
C. Trustees and Directors 
1. ERISA trustees 
The principles applied to resolve conflicts of duty in financial firms 
apply equally to trustees who also serve as company officers and 
directors.  A good example is section 408(c)(3) of ERISA, which 
allows an “officer, employee, agent, or other representative” of a 
company employer also to serve as a trustee for the company’s 
pension or employee benefit plan.330  ERISA provides that plan 
fiduciaries must discharge their duty “solely in the interests of the 
participants and beneficiaries.”331  When the same plan fiduciary, 
however, also serves as an officer or director, and therefore as a 
fiduciary to the company shareholders (and the company itself), 
conflicts inevitably arise.332 
                                                          
(adopting Rule 10b5-1 and stating that, “we derived this provision from the defense 
against liability codified in Exchange Act Rule 14e-3, regarding insider trading in a 
tender offer situation.”). 
 329. The settlements contain undertakings stating, “Research and Investment 
Banking will be physically separated.  Such physical separation will be reasonably 
designed to prevent the intentional and unintentional flow of information between 
Research and Investment Banking.”  See, e.g., Final Judgment as to Defendant Bear 
Stearns & Co. Inc., Addendum A, Undertaking I.4, SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 
No. 03 Civ. 2937 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
litigation/litreleases/finaljudgadda.pdf.  The settlements were subsequently 
approved.  See SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 2937 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 31, 2003) (order approving consent judgments), available at http://www.sec.gov 
/litigation/litreleases/judge18111.pdf; see also In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & 
ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 640 n.77 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (explaining that 
financial institutions are required to erect a “Chinese Wall” between its research 
department and its divisions providing commercial banking, underwriting, or other 
services to issuers of securities to prevent information from the latter influencing the 
former). 
 330. ERISA § 408(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (2004). 
 331. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B). 
 332. See Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction:  
The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1126-28 (1988) (stating that 
ERISA’s use of nonneutral fiduciaries creates an obvious tension with the duty of 
loyalty that is preserved in the exclusive benefit and prohibited transaction rules). 
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This issue was litigated after the fall of Enron Corporation.333  
Employees who participated in three employee pension benefit plans, 
governed by ERISA, alleged that committees, trustees, and individuals 
administering the plans, many of whom were individual officers and 
directors of Enron, breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA.334  
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants breached their duty of 
loyalty to the plan participants by misleading them about Enron’s 
financial condition while inducing them to hold and purchase Enron 
stock.335  The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants had a 
fiduciary duty to disclose Enron’s financial condition to the plan 
participants and beneficiaries.336 
Certain defendants, who served in the dual capacity of plan 
administrator and company director, argued they faced a conflict.  
The defendants urged that if they disclosed to the plan participants 
non-public information about financial improprieties at the 
company, they would violate federal insider trading laws.337  As the 
court explained, Rule 10b-5 requires a corporate insider because he 
owes a fiduciary duty to shareholders to either disclose material non-
public information or abstain from trading.338  Moreover, if a plan 
fiduciary were to tell plan participants about Enron’s true financial 
condition so that they could sell at a high price before the 
information became public, the plan fiduciary could be considered to 
have illegally “tipped” the plan participants, which violates insider 
trading law.339  The directors, in essence, argued they should not be 
forced to violate the duty of loyalty owed to the company, by 
breaching its confidentiality, to further the duty of care owed to the 
plan participants by encouraging them to sell at a high price. 
Judge Harmon remarked, “The fiduciary’s duty to disclose is an 
area of developing and controversial law.”340  In her ruling, she 
emphasized that the plaintiffs were suffering ongoing harm as a 
result of illegal activity at Enron, and the failure to disclose 
information about accounting irregularities and financial 
improprieties “would only serve to make the harm more 
                                                          
 333. In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D. 
Tex. 2003). 
 334. Id. at 530. 
 335. Id. at 555. 
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. at 563. 
 338. Id. at 564 (discussing the Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 
(1951), and citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226-29 (1980)). 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. at 555. 
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widespread.”341  This was not a case where silence would simply 
preserve the status quo.  The company had gone too far down a path 
of financial chicanery for the directors to argue they could remain 
silent and still do no harm.  The court explained that “continued 
silence and deceit would only encourage the alleged fraud and 
increase the extent of injury.”342 
In ruling that the plaintiffs could survive a motion to dismiss, the 
court emphasized the defendants’ acts and not their omissions.  The 
plaintiffs stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty “based on 
Defendants’ alleged inducement of the plan participants to direct the 
trustee to invest in Enron stock.”343  The failure to disclose material 
information about accounting malfeasance was coupled with insiders 
selling their own shares, “while contemporaneously and repeatedly 
exhorting plan participants and beneficiaries at meetings and by e-
mail to buy more.”344  Thus, the Enron case is a further illustration 
that, while one must act in accordance with the duty of loyalty even if 
it results in a diminution in care, one may not uphold the duty of 
loyalty to one principal if the result is a breach of the duty of loyalty 
to another.  As the court noted, one may not “both breach his duty 
under ERISA and, in violation of the securities laws, become part of 
the alleged fraudulent scheme to conceal Enron’s financial condition 
to the continuing detriment of current and prospective Enron 
shareholders.”345  While the defendants tried to argue that they 
sought to uphold their duty of loyalty owed to Enron, even if that 
resulted in a breach of the duty of care to the plan participants, the 
court determined that the breach of duty to the plan participants was 
in the nature of the duty of loyalty and would not be allowed. 
The conflict of duty faced by pension trustees who also serve as 
officers and directors is often crystallized during an attempted 
takeover.  In that context, plan assets may be a tool to help 
management stave off an unwanted bidder, although using plan 
assets in this way may harm the plan participants.  A leading case 
analyzing the conflict raised by these dual roles is Donovan v. 
Bierwith.346  In the fall of 1981, LTV Corporation made a tender offer 
for seventy percent of the outstanding stock and convertible 
securities of Grumman Corporation.347  At the time, the Grumman 
                                                          
 341. Id. at 565. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. at 656. 
 344. Id. at 657. 
 345. Id. at 565. 
 346. 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 347. Id. at 264. 
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corporate pension plan owned 525,000 shares of Grumman stock.348  
Grumman officers, including John Bierwith, the chairman, and 
Robert Freese, the chief financial officer, were trustees for the plan.349  
As part of their strategy to avoid a takeover, the plan trustees voted 
not to tender the plan’s 525,000 shares at $45, and considered the 
merits of purchasing additional shares, on behalf of the plan, which 
were trading in the $30s.350  One benefit of the purchase would have 
been to make it more difficult for LTV to gain control.  The trustees 
decided to purchase Grumman stock up to the maximum of ten 
percent of the value of the plan allowed by ERISA and obtained the 
shares for between $36 and $39.351  Shortly after the purchase, a 
district court enjoined the offer and the price of stock fell to between 
$28 and $30.352 
Judge Friendly’s decision makes plain the classic dilemma these 
individuals faced between upholding the duty of care to the 
corporation or the duty of loyalty to the plan beneficiaries.  
According to the court, the officers “were caught in a difficult and 
unusual situation” and were “honestly convinced” they were doing 
the right thing.353  The officers argued that despite their duty to act 
solely and exclusively in the interest of the plan participants, they “do 
not violate their duties by following a course of action with respect to 
the plan which benefits the corporation as well as the beneficiaries.”354  
Judge Friendly recognized, however, that from the plan participants’ 
perspective, purchasing additional shares “was almost certainly a ‘no-
win’ situation.”355  If the tender offer succeeded, the plan would be a 
minority stockholder in an LTV-controlled Grumman, and if the 
tender offer failed, the price of Grumman shares would likely sink to 
their pre-offer level, as the trustees were aware.356  As the court put it, 
“Mid-October 1981 was thus the worse possible time for the Plan to 
buy Grumman stock as an investment.”357 
The difference between the duty of loyalty and the duty of care—
between acts and omissions—accounts for Judge Friendly’s ruling.  
While the officers were trying to benefit the company as a whole, 
consistent with their duty of care, they could not do so through 
                                                          
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. at 269. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. at 276. 
 354. Id. at 271. 
 355. Id. at 275. 
 356. Id. 
 357. Id. 
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actions that affirmatively harmed the plan participants in violation of 
the duty of loyalty.  The officers, at least with respect to the plan, 
should have simply refrained from acting.  The court noted, 
“Investment considerations dictated a policy of waiting.”358  By taking 
actions to harm the plan participants, even if well-intentioned, the 
officers violated their duty of loyalty and failed to measure up to the 
standards required under ERISA. 
2. Common law trustees 
The cases regarding common law trustees discussed in Part I of the 
Article can now be understood as upholding the duty of loyalty over 
the duty of care.  Recall Rosencrans v. Fry.359  In that case, Fry served in 
two capacities that led to a conflict of duty.  He served on a 
company’s board, owing duties to the company and the shareholders, 
and he served as trustee for a trust that invested in the same 
company, owing a duty to the trust beneficiaries.360  Serving in these 
roles does not necessarily lead to a conflict, but in this case, the 
testator’s wife, Lee, asserted that Fry breached his fiduciary duty to 
the beneficiaries by failing to cause the company to declare a larger 
dividend during the period after the testator’s death.361  Fry opted 
instead to reinvest the earnings in the company’s operations.362 
The conflict over whether to declare the enhanced dividend is 
another example of the classic conflict between upholding the duty 
of loyalty or the duty of care—between refraining from taking an 
action that would harm one principal, although the action would 
assist, incrementally, a second principal.  Declaring the dividend 
would have provided the beneficiaries with an incremental benefit, 
and Fry was arguably required to do so consistent with the duty of 
care.  Declaring the dividend, however, would have harmed the 
company in breach of the duty of loyalty by depleting assets that 
could be used for business purposes.   
When the court decided the case, it framed the issue as a conflict 
between promoting the interests of the beneficiary, on the one hand, 
and harming the corporation, on the other.  The court stated that 
Fry’s duty “does not embrace a duty to advance the interest of the 
beneficiary at the expense of the corporation and other outstanding 
stockholders’ interests.”363  The harm to the company from a 
                                                          
 358. Id. 
 359. 91 A.2d 162 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952). 
 360. Id. at 163. 
 361. Id. at 164-65. 
 362. Id. at 167. 
 363. Id. at 168. 
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declaration of dividends (acting “at the expense of the corporation”) 
would have amounted to a breach of the duty of loyalty.  The 
incremental benefit to the beneficiaries (acting “to advance the 
interest of the beneficiary”) would only further the duty of care. 
The court could have ruled in favor of Lee had it considered this 
case a dilemma between upholding the rights of a trust beneficiary 
versus the rights of company shareholders.  Alternatively, the court 
could have viewed the director’s duty to the company to not declare a 
greater dividend as part of the duty of care, that is, to advance the 
interests of the company by enhancing the residual value of the firm.  
But the court’s analysis was more nuanced.  It recognized the case as 
a conflict between harm to one principal only to promote, 
incrementally, the benefits to a second, and it would not permit the 
harm to occur.  Fry was better off not acting at all than acting to harm 
the company. 
Accordingly, one also may also view this case as turning on the 
difference between acts and omissions.  The gist of the opinion is that 
Fry merely omitted to act to Lee’s benefit; he simply did not cause the 
company to declare the dividend she sought.  He was better off not 
acting, which, while not furthering Lee’s interests, at least did no 
harm.  But the line between acts and omissions is not always clear.364  
Viewing the case as hinging on the difference between acts and 
omissions ignores the fact that Fry acted when he declared a 
dividend, but the dividend was simply too meager for Lee.  One 
could view Fry’s conduct, therefore, not as an omission, but as an act 
injurious to Lee.  In that sense, the nature of the breach could be 
recharacterized as a breach of the duty of loyalty to Lee and not a 
breach of the duty of care.365   
But this argument is ultimately unpersuasive.  Lee’s claim is most 
simply unmasked as a claim for a larger dividend, not a claim that Fry 
took an affirmative act to her detriment.  After all, some benefit is 
better than no benefit at all; a small dividend is better than none.  
This case likely would have been decided differently if the trustee had 
taken steps to affirmatively harm the beneficiaries.  The plaintiff 
alleged only that the trustee failed to declare larger dividends to assist 
the beneficiaries, not that he took positive steps to harm them.366 
                                                          
 364. See supra note 270 and accompanying text. 
 365. Leo Katz’s test for what is an act as opposed to an omission—whether the 
harmful outcome would have occurred the way it did if the defendant did not exist—
is not helpful here because one has no way of knowing the amount of dividend the 
company would have declared, if any, if Fry did not exist.  See supra note 273 and 
accompanying text. 
 366. This outcome is also supported by the result in Siskind v. Sperry Ret. Program, 
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In Shanley’s Estate v. Fidelity Union Trust,367 also discussed in Part I, an 
individual in a similar role took steps that harmed the beneficiaries of 
a trust, while promoting the interests of a company on which he 
served as a director.368  In that case, a trust company was a fiduciary to 
an estate that held shares of a subsidiary company.369  Certain board 
members of the trust company also sat on the board of the 
subsidiary’s parent company while the parent sought to acquire 
shares held by the trust.370  The beneficiaries, however, made plain 
their wishes not to sell, and the court ruled that, when faced with a 
conflict, the trustee should not have acted against the wishes of the 
beneficiaries.371  As the court put it, “their wish should be our trustee’s 
command.”372  Thus, while one could view Shanley’s Estate as a conflict 
between a seller whose interest is to sell dear and a buyer whose 
interest is to buy cheap, it is more plainly viewed as a conflict between 
the duty of care to purchase shares on the parent company’s behalf at 
the best price, and the duty of loyalty to refrain from acting against 
the wishes of the beneficiaries.  The court, while stating that the 
trustees should have contacted the court for instructions, would not 
permit the trustees to violate the principals’ wishes.373 
                                                          
47 F.3d 498, 500 (2d Cir. 1995), discussed above, where individuals had dual roles as 
both company officers, owing a duty to the company, and trustees of a retirement 
plan, owing duties to the plan participants.  Certain employees were excluded from 
an early retirement incentive program and sued.  Id. at 501.  The court was forced to 
decide whether the fiduciaries should have upheld their duty to the company, which 
sought to exclude the employees from the particular plan, or their duty to the 
employees, who sought to participate in the plan.  Id. at 504, 507.  In deciding the 
case in favor of the company and not the employees, the court of appeals focused on 
the lack of harm to the employees.  They were denied only increased benefits 
provided to other employees whose jobs were at greater risk of elimination and 
otherwise “suffered no reduction in the non-Program benefits to which they were 
entitled.”  Id. at 507.  The court found no harm to the employees, only that they 
received fewer benefits than they would have received had they participated in the 
plan.  Id.  The difference between harm, on the one hand, and simply diminished 
benefits, on the other, is consistent with the difference between a violation of the 
duty of loyalty and the duty of care.  The court found no harm to the employees, 
only fewer benefits, and it ruled in favor of the company, not the employees.  Id.  
Explaining this case as a decision whether to uphold the duty of loyalty or the duty of 
care provides a sounder basis for the result than relying on the lack of a property 
interest suggested in the opinion.  Id. 
 367. 138 A. 388 (N.J. Ch. 1927). 
 368. Id. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. at 389. 
 372. Id. 
 373. Shanley’s Estate also can be viewed as presenting a dilemma between a duty of 
loyalty, owed to the principals to refrain from opposing their wishes, and a duty of 
care, owed to those same persons to ensure their investments were sound.  The court 
pointed out that, while the beneficiaries opposed a sale, the trustee argued that he 
had a duty to diversify the investments and that the market for the stocks was 
favorable at the time.  Id.  The trustee expressed concern that he could face liability 
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3. The business judgment rule 
Finally, the notion that courts are more concerned about harm 
inflicted on the principal in violation of the duty of loyalty than about 
promoting the principal’s well-being consistent with the duty of care 
is reflected through the application of the business judgment rule, 
which sits at the intersection of the duties of loyalty and care.  Courts 
applying the business judgment rule look first to whether the 
directors have violated the duty of loyalty.  Has there been fraud or 
self-dealing?  If not, courts presume the director has exercised 
informed business judgment, consistent with his duty of care.374  If, 
however, a court finds a director violated his duty of loyalty, through 
self-dealing or other improper actions, the court will find the director 
liable for a breach of fiduciary duty without further inquiry into the 
reasonableness of his actions under the duty of care. 
This point is now codified in the Delaware General Corporation 
Law.  Section 102(b)(7) provides that a company’s certificate of 
incorporation may contain a provision limiting a director’s liability 
for a breach of fiduciary duty as long as the provision does not limit 
liability for breach of the duty of loyalty or good faith.375  The business 
judgment rule does not protect actions taken in bad faith.376  And bad 
faith is not mere negligence, rather, it implies “the conscious doing 
of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity . . . a 
state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.”377  
Thus, as long as the director has not acted to harm another—a 
breach of the duty of loyalty—his liability for a breach of the duty of 
care may be limited. 
In each of the three areas examined—attorney-client relations, 
responsibilities of financial firms, and duties of directors and 
trustees—a common theme emerges:  courts are more concerned 
with potential harm to a fiduciary’s principal than with inadequate 
                                                          
to certain beneficiaries who were then infants if he failed to diversify, and he offered 
to refrain from selling the shares only if he would be indemnified against loss 
resulting from such a claim.  Id.  The court, however, was far more concerned that 
the trustee not act contrary to the wishes of the beneficiaries than that he act to 
increase incrementally the benefits to the infants.  Id.  The court said, “Our trustee, 
apparently, is not alarmed over liability for selling the stock against the protest of a 
large majority of our wards, and without indemnity against personal loss.”  Id. 
 374. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text. 
 375. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). 
 376. In re Croton River Club, Inc., 52 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Wash. 
Bancorp. v. Said, 812 F. Supp. 1256, 1269 (D.D.C. 1993) (lack of good faith requires 
an allegation that the decision was motivated by self-interest). 
 377. Desert Equities, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II, L.P., 624 
A.2d 1199, 1208 n.16 (Del. 1993) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 337 (5th ed. 
1983)). 
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stewardship or other violations of the duty of care.  In each case, 
when faced with a conflict of duty owed to multiple principals, courts 
preserve the duty of loyalty over the duty of care.  The theme is 
persistent.  It presents itself not only in the case law, but also in the 
Restatement’s rules on consenting to attorneys’ conflicts, in 
procedures established by financial firms, and in the business 
judgment rule for company directors.  None of this should come as a 
surprise.  The theme is based on the difference between duties of 
loyalty and care, which itself is rooted in the difference between 
Kant’s perfect and imperfect duties. 
CONCLUSION 
While duties of loyalty generally do not conflict with other duties of 
loyalty, and while conflicting duties of care typically only raise issues 
of competing resources, the fiduciary’s duty of loyalty can conflict 
with the duty of care leaving her boxed into a corner.  Approaches 
taken by some courts on an ad hoc basis cannot be applied easily to 
others.  A closer look at the cases, enriched by a deeper 
understanding of the nature of the fiduciary duties of loyalty and 
care, points to a consistent approach.  When a fiduciary is faced with 
a conflict, because acting to benefit one principal would result in 
harm to another, courts generally hold that the fiduciary should 
refrain from acting.  In such cases, a breach of the duty of care is 
treated more leniently than a breach of the duty of loyalty.  This 
explains why the duty of confidentiality trumps the duty to provide a 
more effective defense or provide better investment advice.  The 
principal’s first claim is that the fiduciary must refrain from causing 
harm; a claim to the performance of positive acts is secondary.  At its 
core, the approach is self-evident.  “Do no harm” is the clarion call of 
every fiduciary. 
 
